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Foreword
I am delighted to present this report by the Trinity College Dublin COVID-19 Law 
and Human Rights Observatory, which we commissioned in autumn 2020. We 
did so in order to take stock of, and to better understand, the human rights and 
equality implications of the emergency measures undertaken since March 2020 to 
tackle the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The pandemic has posed an unprecedented and complex set of challenges to 
both State and society. Thousands of people have lost their lives and many more 
have experienced severe illness, while hundreds of thousands have seen their 
livelihoods affected. Many more have seen essential services, support mechanisms 
and community structures, on which they rely, stripped away and severely curtailed 
by the pandemic, and by the measures put in place to tackle it. 
COVID-19 is more than a public health crisis. It is arguably the most significant set 
of human rights and equality challenges Ireland has ever faced. The way in which 
state and society meet these challenges, and adapt and improve as lessons are 
learned, will be a measure of how durable Ireland’s commitment is to human rights 
and equality, and how much we need to strengthen our efforts. 
From the outset of the pandemic, and from the earliest introduction of legal and 
policy measures to address it, the Commission has stressed the need for the State 
to have regard to the human rights and equality impacts of its emergency decision-
making. The COVID-19 crisis presented an unprecedented challenge to the State, 
and its obligation to protect the rights to life and health.  However, it remains 
essential, and is in the public interest, that human rights and equality norms are 
upheld to the greatest extent possible. This adherence to the principles of human 
rights and equality is not only important to protect people in times of crisis, it is 
also about protecting against erosion of our values, our democracy, and the rights 
and equality we all deserve .    
In particular, the Commission stressed the importance of ensuring clarity, 
transparency and adequate scrutiny of the regulations arising from the emergency 
legislation enacted in the early days of the pandemic, as well as transparency in 
the exercise of new powers by An Garda Síochána and other agents of the State. 
The Commission has also communicated to Government and the Oireachtas that 
the lessons learned thus far during this crisis must be brought to bear on how we 
continue to address the pandemic, as well as on how we meet the challenges of any 
potential future national emergency. 
This is the context in which we commissioned this report from the Trinity College 
Dublin COVID-19 Law and Human Rights Observatory. The report provides a clear 
overview of the human rights and equality obligations that must inform the state’s 
deployment of emergency powers in response to COVID-19. It also demonstrates 
the crucial relevance of the Public Sector Human Rights and Equality Duty and its 
function in informing decision-making on all aspects of law and policy. The report 
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provides an insightful account of the manner in which emergency measures and 
regulations are being decided and introduced, including where there appear to be 
concerning gaps in transparency and in our systems of democratic scrutiny.
While, in the main, such measures can be justified by the obligation on the State to 
protect public health, the report identifies some areas of particular concern shared 
by the Commission. 
These include:
 • The blurring of the boundary between legal requirements and public 
health guidance – something which is fundamentally out of step with 
the principle of the rule of law; 
 • The potential for emergency measures and their enforcement to 
disproportionately affect certain disadvantaged and more vulnerable 
groups, including the significant effect of indirect enforcement. Of 
particular and urgent concern is the relaxation of procedural safeguards 
for detention on mental health grounds; and
 • The lack of human rights and equality expertise in the decision-making 
structures put in place to tackle the pandemic, or in the systems that 
implement and scrutinise these decisions. This also encompasses 
a notable lack of consultation with groups likely to be particularly 
impacted. 
The Commission also welcomes the authors call for greater scrutiny and human 
rights proofing of regulations, including through the establishment of a Joint 
Oireachtas Committee on Equality, Human Rights and Diversity – something for 
which we have long advocated. The authors’ focus on the importance of adequate 
collection of disaggregated data – fundamental to understanding the differentiated 
impact of the emergency measures on different groups – is also welcomed. 
We hope this report will make a contribution in identifying some of the core areas 
where we can enhance protections of human rights, equality and the rule of law 
when adopting and implementing emergency powers,  both as we continue to 
grapple with the current pandemic, and in potential future national emergencies.  
A report such as this, however, can only begin to document the human rights and 
equality challenges presented by COVID-19. 
COVID-19 has both exposed and exacerbated existing inequality in Ireland, and has 
intensified the challenges we all face to tackle it. Over the course of the pandemic, 
this inequality is evidenced in the sharp divergence in the experience of different 
groups in our society and, at times, a divergence in rights.  
One significant disparity in rights is reflected in the treatment of people with 
disabilities. A sudden and novel public health crisis presents an enormous 
challenge to any State, and its services.  However, as the pandemic has progressed, 
there has been little evidence in the policy response that the need to balance 
the requirement to protect health and life, and other rights and freedoms, has 
reflected the particular rights and freedoms of people with disabilities.   
Intersecting with the experience of people with disabilities during the pandemic, 
is that of older people, many of whom have age-related disabilities and live in 
congregated settings such as nursing homes where the impact of the virus has 
been particularly severe. Due to their particular vulnerability to the virus, and 
to public health measures such as ‘cocooning’, older people have experienced 
a significant level of isolation and dislocation from their families, and prolonged 
disconnection from social supports.
A second clear divergence has been along socio-economic lines, with certain 
people, including children without access to technology or space for remote 
learning; people living in overcrowded accommodation, including Direct Provision 
centres, Travellers and Roma; as well as those in precarious employment, 
experiencing the impact of the pandemic more acutely.
A third clear trend has been in the divergence of the experience of women and 
men, specifically with reference to a dramatic increase in reported domestic 
violence, and the impact of school and childcare closures on working mothers.
The Commission is committed to continuing its work to independently scrutinise 
the State’s approach to the pandemic. 
Many, if not most fundamental societal challenges laid bare by the pandemic 
– systemic inequality, the strains on our social harmony, the serious gaps in 
democratic scrutiny and accountability – will not fade away as the virus does. 
However, our collective experience of the pandemic, our renewed appreciation of 
community and solidarity, and this magnification of our most fundamental societal 
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Executive Summary
Since March 2020, the Oireachtas has enacted four statutes and the Minister for 
Health has made 67 sets of regulations to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
These have provided for a wide range of emergency restrictions on the everyday 
lives of ordinary people, enforceable through various mechanisms. These 
restrictions and their enforcement, while addressed to the management of an 
unprecedented public health crisis, raise significant human rights and equality 
concerns.
The Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (IHREC) commissioned this 
Report as part of its remit to keep under review the adequacy and effectiveness 
of law and practice in the State relating to the protection of human rights and 
equality. The Report has been written by four members of the COVID-19 Law and 
Human Rights Observatory at Trinity College Dublin: Dr Conor Casey, Prof Oran 
Doyle, Prof David Kenny, and Dr Donna Lyons.
The Report identifies the human rights and equality obligations, in both national 
and international law, that control the State’s response to COVID-19. In particular, 
the Report identifies how section 42 of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Act 2014 
obliges the Department of Health, the Health Service Executive (HSE), the Chief 
Medical Officer, National Public Health Emergency Team (NPHET), and An Garda 
Síochána to have regard to the need to eliminate discrimination when performing 
their functions.
The Report concludes that the principal measures introduced to control the 
pandemic—restrictions on movement and home gatherings, obligations to wear 
face coverings—are justified by the obligation on the State to protect public 
health. The Report, however, concludes that the erosion of procedural safeguards 
in respect of mental health detention effected by Part V of the Emergency 
Measures in the Public Interest (Covid-19) Act 2020 is no longer justified, and 
therefore recommends its immediate repeal.
Even though the principal measures introduced to control the pandemic are 
justified, there remain significant human rights and equality concerns in two 
separate but related respects.
First, the State has repeatedly blurred the boundary between legal requirements 
and public health guidance, generating widespread confusion about the extent 
of people’s legal obligations. This offends the rule of law, disrespects people’s 
autonomy and, in several specific respects, breaches standards of national and 
international law.
Second, the restrictions and their enforcement have disproportionately affected 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, protected by various national and 
international legal instruments. Members of some of these already vulnerable 
groups are also the most at risk of uncertainty about their legal obligations when 
they interact with Gardaí in enforcement contexts.
The Government has also targeted vulnerable groups for indirect enforcement of 
public health advice through presenting it as effectively mandatory—most notably 
in April-May by telling older people that they must ‘cocoon’—and by relying on 
other statutory schemes to enforce compliance with health advice—most notably 
in relation to social welfare recipients leaving the country.
The Report recommends that the Government should at all times maintain a clear 
distinction between measures that are legally obligatory and public health advice. 
In particular, the Government should not present public health advice as if were 
criminally enforceable.
It is likely to be the case—based on the nature of the restrictions, media reports 
of individual instances, and prior experiences of policing—that the enforcement 
powers are exercised by the Gardaí in a way that disproportionately affects 
groups such as young people, ethnic and racial minorities, and Travellers and 
Roma. But this cannot be ascertained because An Garda Síochána does not 
maintain disaggregated data that track how enforcement powers are exercised 
against particular groups. This has become even more pressing as use of new 
powers to fine those travelling outside their home has become commonplace. 
The Report joins both IHREC and the Policing Authority in recommending that the 
Garda Commissioner take steps to ensure that disaggregated data is obtained 
on the exercise of all enforcement powers, tracking all prohibited grounds of 
discrimination under the Equal Status Acts 2000-2015. Failure to do so is itself a 
breach of international human rights standards.
The Report traces many of these difficulties to the failure to have regard to human 
rights and equality standards in the law-making process. Although Members of the 
Oireachtas were attuned to these concerns, they were hampered by the lack of any 
structure in the Oireachtas for formal engagement with human rights and equality 
norms. More fundamentally, the fact that most restrictions are introduced by the 
Minister for Health through regulations makes it difficult to maintain effective 
democratic oversight.
Problems in the law-making process are exacerbated by the relationship between 
NPHET and Government. While the contours of this relationship have shifted over 
time, NPHET remains a powerful actor in the decision-making process in a way 
that diminishes attention to human rights and equality concerns. NPHET lacks 
the expertise to grapple with human rights and equality standards and indeed 
 ʥ  ...the Government should at all times maintain a 
clear distinction between measures that are legally 
obligatory and public health advice. In particular, the 
Government should not present public health advice as 
if were criminally enforceable.
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abolished its subgroup that had some expertise on these issues. Yet once NPHET’s 
recommendations have been made, there is little time—even if there were 
willingness—to engage in human rights and equality scrutiny at Government level.
The Report makes several recommendations to address these defects in the law-
making process, the most important of which are the following:
 • The establishment of a Joint Oireachtas Committee on Equality, 
Human Rights and Diversity, (a) to review all primary legislation adopted 
as part of the COVID-19 response and (b) to report to the Houses of the 
Oireachtas on all Ministerial regulations;
 • All statutes adopted as part of the COVID-19 response should be 
subject to sunset clauses that allow for time-limited extensions of 
three months, by resolution of both Houses of the Oireachtas;
 • NPHET should (a) establish a sub-group with the relevant expertise to 
address ethical, human rights, and equality concerns and (b) include 
such expertise within NPHET itself;
 • The Government oversight committee that filters NPHET 
recommendations should have representation from the Department of 
Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth;
 • The Minister for Health should publish a human rights and equality 
analysis of the proportionality of each set of regulations within 48 hours 
of them being made; and
 • Section 31A of the Health Act 1947 should provide that all regulations 
made by the Minister for Health will lapse within 10 sitting days if not 
positively endorsed by resolution of each House of the Oireachtas.
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On 12 March 2020, then Taoiseach Leo Varadkar announced restrictions—from the 
closure of schools and universities to advised limits on mass gatherings—in order 
to slow the spread of COVID-19.2 These restrictions were not legally enforceable, 
but the Oireachtas has since enacted four statutes and the Minister for Health 
has made 67 sets of regulations. These regulations respond to an unprecedented 
public health crisis and have had an unprecedented impact on the ordinary, 
everyday life of all who live in Ireland.
This Report provides a human rights and equality analysis of the emergency 
powers adopted by the State to respond to COVID-19. It was commissioned 
by the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (IHREC). IHREC is Ireland’s 
national human rights and equality institution. It is an independent public body 
that accounts to the Oireachtas, with a mandate established under the Irish Human 
Rights and Equality Commission Act 2014. On 25 March 2020, IHREC wrote to the 
Taoiseach emphasising the need to ensure emergency legislation in response to 
COVID-19 was necessary, proportionate and fair, and that it was implemented 
in line with human rights and equality principles.3 IHREC has made numerous 
public contributions on specific issues arising from the pandemic. In September 
2020, IHREC commissioned this Report as part of its remit to keep under review 
the adequacy and effectiveness of law and practice in the State relating to the 
protection of human rights and equality.
This Report seeks to undertake a detailed examination of the core measures taken 
by the State in response to the COVID-19 pandemic that touch upon rights and 
equality concerns. The Report concludes that, in broad terms, the core pandemic 
measures that have been taken, though restricting rights in various respects, 
are generally proportionate and justified in light of the scale of the public health 
emergency facing the State. However, several major problems exist: a potentially 
unconstitutional restriction of rights of those in mental health detention; a series 
of issues around the drawing up and presentation of legal rules and public health 
advice that raise rule of law concerns; a disparate impact of pandemic measures on 
vulnerable groups, exacerbated by a lack of information about enforcement; and 
a failure in political oversight of pandemic response measures that would better 
ensure human rights compliance.
Chapters 1-3 of the Report outline the most salient human rights and equality 
standards, the statutory framework introduced by the Oireachtas, and the most 
relevant legal restrictions introduced by the Minister for Health. Chapters 1-3 
pay particular attention to the Public Sector Equality and Human Rights Duty—
contained in section 42 of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Act 2014 
and applicable to the Department of Health, the HSE, the Chief Medical Officer, the 
National Public Health Emergency Team, and An Garda Síochána—to have regard 
to the need to eliminate discrimination when performing their functions. They 
2  ‘Taoiseach’s full statement: “I need to speak to you about coronavirus”’, RTE.ie (12 March 2020).
3  IHREC, ‘Letter to An Taoiseach in relation to the COVID-19 Pandemic’, (25 March 2020)
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also outline the legal restrictions and enforcement powers introduced during the 
pandemic, covering the period April-November 2020.
Chapters 4-7 analyse the law-making process. They assess the extent to which 
human rights and equality concerns have been addressed in both the legislative 
process within the Oireachtas and the regulation-making process. They track the 
relationship between NPHET and Government over the course of the pandemic and 
identify the points at which human rights and equality concerns could be addressed. 
They also explore how the law has been presented and described by Government in 
ways that tend to overstate the restrictions on people’s behaviour and to blur the 
important boundary between legal regulation and public health advice.
Chapters 8-9 undertake a human rights and equality analysis of the most relevant 
restrictions, and of how they have been enforced. They pay particular attention 
to the vague formulation of criminal standards, the effect of the restrictions on 
disadvantaged groups protected in national and international law, and the possibly 
disproportionate exercises of enforcement powers. In this regard, they  examine 
an apparent  failure of An Garda Síochána to maintain disaggregated data on the 
exercise of enforcement powers. This is something that has become even more 
pressing in early 2021, with new powers used to issue 1,500 fines on those travelling 
outside their home over a period of two weeks in January.4
The Report seeks to contribute to public debate, both by making its own 
recommendations in chapter 10 and by providing a body of research and analysis 
to inform further contributions by IHREC and others. This is relevant not only in 
respect of the current pandemic but also more generally for the adequacy of the 
state’s framework to respond to future emergencies.5 Core recommendations 
include the establishment of a parliamentary committee on diversity, human 
rights and equality (or similar body) to provide oversight of rights concerns in the 
law-making process; a series of specific oversight measures, such as rigorous 
sunsetting and parliamentary validation of all core COVID-19-response regulations; 
and new structures to ensure rights are robustly considered in the making of these 
regulations.
Two limitations of the Report’s scope should be noted, one temporal and one of 
subject matter.
The primary research conducted for this Report was carried out between 
September and November 2020. It thus deals with the law and practice as it was on 
30 November 2020. There have been some significant subsequent developments 
between then and the Report’s publication, some of which develop further the 
4  https://www.irishexaminer.com/news/arid-40213823.html
5  IHREC, ‘Submission to the Special Committee on COVID-19 Response Regarding the Adequacy of the 
State’s Legislative Framework to Respond to COVID-19 Pandemic and Potential Future National Emergencies’ 
(September 2020).
substantial rights concerns identified prior to December 2020. The most notable 
of these are the mooted introduction of mandatory quarantine for those travelling 
into Ireland; the introduction in practice of on-the-spot fines as a primary method 
of enforcement; the rollout of a nationwide vaccination programme; and the 
closing of schools, including special educational provision, for an extended period 
in January and February 2021, leading to the initiation of High Court proceedings.6 
These and other developments of this sort are referenced in the footnotes in this 
Report, but are not be comprehensively addressed in the main text. Nevertheless, 
the analysis in the main text assists in both identifying such issues and suggesting 
appropriate responses.
In addition, the need to provide a coherent and concise analysis, that can 
meaningfully contribute to public debate, has led us to focus on those measures 
adopted to control the spread of COVID-19 that have impacted most directly on 
individuals in their ordinary, everyday lives. Although human rights and equality 
concerns are at their most acute in this domain, this focus excludes a number of 
related areas that raise significant human rights and equality concerns. We wish to 
recognise these expressly here, lest their exclusion from the Report be interpreted 
as a lack of concern on the part of the authors, or IHREC itself.
First, it has been well documented that the pandemic itself has a differential 
impact on particular groups—especially racial and ethnic minorities,7 older 
people,8 women and mothers, and those in prison. IHREC has drawn attention to 
how inadequate conditions on Traveller halting sites, such as the lack of running 
water, makes Travellers particularly vulnerable to the pandemic.9 These differential 
impacts require focused policy responses that take into account human rights and 
equality concerns.
Second, other state policies—for instance the system of direct provision for 
asylum seekers—have intensified the effect of COVID-19 for disadvantaged 
groups.10 The pandemic has increased the urgency of implementing the 
recommendation of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) to Ireland that it develop an alternative reception model for 
people seeking asylum, and should take concrete steps to phase out the Direct 
Provision system. Relatedly, IHREC has drawn attention to the challenges for those 
living in congregated settings, whether people with disabilities, older people, or 
6  https://www.rte.ie/news/2021/0127/1192369-education-court-challenge/
7  In the US context, see Center for Diseases Control and Prevention, ‘Health Equity Considerations and 
Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups’ (2020) (visited 27 November 2020).
8  Hernandez et al, ‘High-risk categories for COVID-19 and their distribution by county in Republic of Ireland-
evidence from the TILDA study’ (2020).
9  IHREC, Comments on Ireland’s 17th National Report on the Implementation of the European Social 
Charter, (June 2020).
10  IHREC, ‘Statement from the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission In Respect of Direct Provision’, 
(8 May 2020); IHREC, ‘Statement from the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission In Respect of Direct 
Provision’ (19 August 2020).
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those in prisons and mental health detention facilities.11
Third, the restrictions introduced to control the pandemic themselves introduce 
socioeconomic hardship, to which the State has responded through a series 
of measures. IHREC has already drawn attention to some concerns about the 
distributional effect of these measures.12 This response is addressed in a report 
recently published by the Observatory,13 but further analysis from a human rights 
and equality perspective would be highly desirable.
Finally, even within the regulations on which this Report focuses, there are many 
other restrictions on businesses, restaurants, pubs, sport training, and events 
in general. The Report does not focus on these for two related reasons. On the 
one hand, the legal measures are so complex and frequently changing that it 
would have considerably lengthened an already lengthy Report to present them 
accurately. On the other hand, the human rights and equality concerns, while 
still real, become less pressing the more one moves way from interpersonal 
relationships, particularly those within the home, towards commercial activity. In 
broad terms, the public health justification for measures that impose significant 
limitations on personal freedom are even more likely to justify restrictions 
on business activities; the rule of law concerns should remain the same; and 
businesses do not receive the same protection in national or international human 
rights and equality law as do individuals.14
11  IHREC, ‘The Impact of COVID-19 on People with Disabilities: Submission by the Irish Human Rights and 
Equality Commission to the Oireachtas Special Committee on COVID-19 Response’ (June 2020).
12  On the legality of the Wage Subsidy Scheme insofar as it related to employees returning from maternity 
leave, see IHREC, ‘Letter to Minister for Finance & Public Expenditure and Reform, Paschal Donohoe TD’ (28 
May 2020). On the legality of the exclusion of certain persons living in Direct Provision from the Pandemic 
Unemployment Payment, see IHREC, ‘Letter to Minister for Employment Affairs and Social Protection, Regina 
Doherty TD’ (29 May 2020)
13  COVID-19 Law and Human Rights Observatory, ‘Law and Policy Responses to COVID-19 in Ireland: 
Supporting Individuals, Communities, Business, and the Economy’ (10 December 2020).
14  For readers who wish to explore these issues further, the Observatory Blog has addressed them on a 
number of occasions.
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Chapter 1
Overview of Human 
Rights and Equality 
Guarantees
Introduction
Ireland, like nearly every country in the world, has imposed significant restrictions 
on ordinary everyday life in order to limit and control the spread of COVID-19. 
Few would question the entitlement of—and even the obligation on—the State 
to adopt measures of this type to protect its citizens. But those measures raise 
human rights and equality concerns, in particular in relation to disadvantaged 
and vulnerable groups. In this chapter, we outline the human rights and equality 
standards against which we will assess the adoption, import, and enforcement 
of the measures in later chapters. Although we refer to legal instruments and 
court decisions, our purpose is not to identify grounds of legal challenge to the 
measures. Rather, we seek to identify human rights and equality concerns so that 
these may be more successfully addressed by policymakers as the pandemic 
continues and in any future public health emergencies.
In this chapter, we outline the relevant human rights and equality standards, and 
later in the Report we will engage in more detailed analysis where appropriate 
in the context of particular infringements. The following legal instruments 
are particularly relevant to our analysis: the Constitution of Ireland 1937 (the 
Constitution), the Equal Status Acts 2000-2015 (ESA), the Employment Equality 
Acts 2000-2015 (EEA), the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Act 2014, 
the European Convention on Human Rights 1951 (ECHR), the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 1966, the Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 1965, the Convention on the Elimination of 
all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 1979, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) 1989, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) 2006.
These legal instruments have varying degrees of enforceability. The obligations 
in the Constitution directly control the State in all respects. The obligations in 
the ECHR are indirectly incorporated at a sub-constitutional level through the 
European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, while individuals can bring the 
State to the European Court of Human Rights for alleged breaches of the ECHR 
having exhausted domestic remedies. The ESA cannot control statutes passed 
by the Oireachtas and probably also cannot control regulations adopted by 
Government Ministers.15 Although Ireland is a party to the ICCPR, ICESR, and 
other UN treaties mentioned above, it has not incorporated these treaties into 
national law.16 They are therefore not directly enforceable in the same way as the 
15  G v The Department of Social Protection [2015] IEHC 419, [2015] 4 IR 167 [142].
16  It should be noted that there are a variety of enforcement mechanisms at the international level vis-à-vis 
the international human rights treaties to which Ireland is a state party. In relation to international oversight 
of Ireland’s obligations under the ICESCR specifically, see Donna Lyons, ‘Ratification of the Optional Protocol 
to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Particularly Pressing in Pandemic Context’ 
COVID-19 Law and Human Rights Observatory Blog (29 June 2020).
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ECHR. That said, international standards to which the State has committed itself 
may be employed as interpretative tools in both policy-formation and decision-
making. All these instruments—irrespective of their precise legal status—reflect 
human rights and equality standards to which the State has committed. They are 
therefore of fundamental importance in framing the analysis presented in this 
Report.
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 2000, in principle, only applies to Member 
States when they are implementing EU law.17 That said, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union has been relatively liberal in its interpretation of the 
Charter, extending it to a broader range of measures falling within the scope of 
application of EU law. We limit our consideration of the Charter to the obligations 
on international passengers arriving in the State, in chapter 8, as EU rights of free 
movement might be engaged in that context.
Human rights
Life, health, and bodily integrity
Human rights are not simply about protecting citizens from state action. Article 
40.3 of the Constitution obliges the State to respect, defend, and vindicate the 
personal rights of the citizen, including their life and person. The courts have also 
recognised a right to bodily integrity.18 In some cases, the courts have suggested 
that limited positive obligations might derive from these rights.19 Article 2 of the 
ECHR, Article 6 of the ICCPR, Article 6 of the CRC, and Article 10 of the CRPD 
protect the right to life. Article 12 of the ICESCR recognises the right of everyone 
to the ‘enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ 
which includes the prevention, treatment, and control of epidemic diseases.20 The 
right to physical and mental health is also identifiable in Article 12 CEDAW, Article 
5(e)(iv) of CERD, Article 24 of the CRC, and Article 25 of the CRPD.
Although this Report largely focuses on circumstances in which the State has 
restricted rights, the State’s response to the pandemic has also been an attempt 
to protect important rights. This is a relevant factor in considering whether certain 
rights-restrictions are justified.
17  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2000] OJ C364/01, art 51. It should be noted 
that the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (the FRA) is the recognised body for promoting and 
assisting with implementation of the rights outlined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights throughout the EU.
18  Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 219.
19  State (C) v Frawley [1976] IR 365; O’Donnell v South Dublin County Council [2015] IESC 28.
20  Article 12 has been interpreted and elaborated upon by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (the oversight mechanism for the ICESCR) in its General Comment No. 14 (2000) UN Doc 
E/C.12/2000/4.
Privacy, family life, and the dwelling
The courts have held that Article 40.3 of the Constitution protects a right to 
privacy against the State.21 Article 41 protects the family in its constitution and 
authority. Article 40.5 provides that ‘the dwelling of every citizen is inviolable 
and shall not be forcibly entered save in accordance with law.’ While the case law 
traditionally focused on the need for proper authorisation for intrusions into 
the dwelling,22 in recent years the courts have identified circumstances in which 
Article 40.5 might be infringed without anyone entering the dwelling.23 Article 8 
of the ECHR provides that everyone has the right to respect for ‘his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence’. Article 17 of the ICCPR guarantees 
freedom from interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence. Other 
international human rights relating to private and family life are identifiable in 
Article 23(1) of the ICCPR, Article 10(1) of the ICESCR, Article 16 of the CRC, 
and Articles 22 and 23 of the CRPD. In this Report, we pay particular attention 
to measures that interfere with physical spaces that are normally the reserve of 
private and family life, principally the dwelling.
Autonomy and personal liberty
The constitutional protection of privacy and the person, as well as the equivalent 
protections in the ECHR and ICCPR, demonstrate a concern for personal 
autonomy. Individuals are entitled to make decisions about their own lives for 
themselves, at least to the extent that they do not interfere with other people 
or offend other competing values.24 In this Report, we pay particular attention to 
measures that require people to make decisions about their own life that they 
ordinarily might not need to make.
Article 40.4 of the Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his 
liberty, save in accordance with law. Where the State deprives a person of his or 
21  Kennedy v Ireland [1987] IR 587.
22  Damache v DPP [2012] IESC 11; [2012] 2 IR 266.
23  Sullivan v Boylan & Ors (No 2) [2013] IEHC 104.
24  Fleming v Ireland [2013] IESC 19, [2013] 2 IR 417.
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her liberty on health grounds, the Court of Appeal has held that there must be an 
independent review of the deprivation of liberty.25 Article 5 of the ECHR protects 
the rights to liberty and security of person, and states that no one should be 
deprived of liberty save in accordance with law. Article 5(1)(e) of the ECHR permits 
such a denial of liberty in the case of ‘the lawful detention of persons for the 
prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind…’. 
The right to liberty and security is also identifiable in Article 9(1) of the ICCPR, and 
Article 14 of the CRPD.
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) outlines 
various rights for those with physical, mental, intellectual, and sensory 
disabilities.26 Article 14(1) of the UNCRPD provides that State's Parties shall 
ensure the right to liberty and security of people with disabilities. This also means 
ensuring that people with disabilities ‘are not deprived of their liberty unlawfully or 
arbitrarily, and that any deprivation of liberty is in conformity with the law, and that 
the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty.’27 Article 
14(2) of the UNCRPD notes that where people with disabilities are deprived of 
liberty through any process, that they are ‘on an equal basis with others, entitled to 
guarantees in accordance with international human rights law’.28
The UN Report of the CRPD has noted that involuntary commitment of persons 
with disabilities on health-care grounds ‘contradicts the absolute ban on 
deprivation of liberty on the basis of impairment’29 and the principle of free and 
informed consent.
The Committee has repeatedly stated that States parties should repeal 
provisions that allow for the involuntary commitment of persons with disabilities 
in mental health institutions based on actual or perceived impairment. 
Involuntary commitment in mental health facilities carries with it the denial of 
the person’s legal capacity to decide about care, treatment and admission to 
a hospital or institution, and therefore violates article 12 in conjunction with 
article 14.30
Freedom of movement and travel
The courts have recognised an unenumerated right to travel.31 Article 2(1) of 
25  AB v Clinical Director of St Loman’s Hospital [2018] IECA 123, [2018] 3 IR 710.
26  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entered into force 3 
May 2008) A/RES/61/106 (UNCRPD), art 1.
27 ibid art 14(1)(b).
28  ibid art 14(2).
29  United Nations Report of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN Doc. A/72/55) at 
Annex para 10.
30  ibid. Emphasis added.
31  State (M) v Attorney General [1979] IR 73.
Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR provides that everyone lawfully within the territory of a 
state shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom 
to choose their residence. Article 12 of the ICCPR guarantees liberty of movement. 
The right to free movement is also identifiable in Article 5(d)(i) of CERD and Article 
18 of the CRPD. In this Report, we pay particular attention to measures that 
confine people to their homes or their county of residence, as well as to measures 
that make it more difficult for people to leave or enter the State.32
Education
Article 42 of the Constitution guarantees a number of educational rights and 
imposes an obligation on the State to provide for free primary education. 
Importantly, this includes a right to an education appropriate to a child’s needs 
and is not limited to a traditional, scholastic education. Article 42A guarantees 
the natural and imprescriptible rights of the child. Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the 
ECHR provides that no person shall be denied the right to education. Article 13 
of the ICESR, Article 10 of CEDAW, Article 5(e)(v) of CERD, Articles 28 and 29 of 
the CRC, and Article 24 CRPD provide for a right to education. In this Report, we 
pay particular attention to how movement restrictions in the early stages of the 
pandemic interfered with children’s education.33
Freedom of religious practice
Article 44.2.1° of the Constitution protects the free profession and practice of 
religion. Article 9 of the ECHR and Article 18 of the ICCPR protect freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. The right is also identifiable in Article 5(d)(vii) 
of CERD, Article 14 of the CRC, and Article 21 of the CRPD. In this Report, we pay 
particular attention to how restrictions on movement and on the holding of events 
have affected religious practice.
Criminal process rights and the rule of law
Article 38.1 of the Constitution guarantees the right to trial in due course of law. 
This has been held to preclude vague criminal offences; in other words, criminal 
offences must be formulated sufficiently clearly to allow people know whether 
their actions would break the criminal law.34 Reflecting the same concern for the 
32  We note that at the time of finalising this Report in late January 2021, the Government was considering 
introducing mandatory quarantine for travellers arriving into the State. No such proposals had been finalised or 
enacted.
33  The closure of schools in early 2021, and the failure of Government to agree with teachers’ unions a plan 
to reopen school for those with special educational needs, presents important issues for further analysis.
34  Dokie v DPP [2010] IEHC 110, [2011] 1 IR 805.
13 14Ireland’s Emergency Powers During the Covid-19 Pandemic Ireland’s Emergency Powers During the Covid-19 Pandemic
rule of law, Article 15.5 of the Constitution prohibits the imposition of retroactive 
penal sanctions. International human rights law contains similar prohibitions. 
Article 7 of the ECHR and Article 15 of the ICCPR both provide that no one shall 
be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a criminal offence at the time when it was committed. The 
European Court of Human Rights has interpreted this to include a prohibition 
on vague criminal offences. The Court has thus stated that vague criminal laws 
are contrary to the principle of legality in the EHCR and that criminal laws must 
meet the tests of clarity and foreseeability in order to be permissible under the 
Convention.35
The rule of law is a core value in a liberal democracy. In essence, it requires first 
that those who are subject to the law can know what the law is so that they can 
guide their behaviour accordingly; and second, that state officials exercise their 
powers in accordance with the law. Laws should be published before they come 
into force; they should be clear and non-contradictory.
In this Report, we pay particular attention to criminal process provisions as well 
as to several ways in which the State’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic has 
been unclear, raising rule of law concerns.
Equality and vulnerable groups
Constitutional and international equality standards
A range of legal instruments, in both national and international law, contain equality 
standards. Article 40.1 of the Constitution protects the equality of citizens before 
the law, while allowing enactments to have due regard to differences of capacity 
and moral function. However, this right has not been very strongly protected, 
particularly in what are perceived to be socially difficult situations.36 The courts 
have also not yet applied Art 40.1 to prohibit indirect discrimination.37
35  Liivik v Estonia App no 12157/05 (ECtHR, 25 June 2009).
36  D (M) (A Minor) v Ireland AG & DPP [2012] IESC 10; [2012] 1 IR 697. For discussion, see
37  For recent discussion, see Oran Doyle and Tom Hickey, Constitutional Law: Text, Cases and Materials 
(Clarus Press, 2019) ch14.
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Article 14 of the ECHR prevents discrimination in the enjoyment of rights and 
freedoms ‘on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth 
or other status.’ This is also captured in Articles 2(1), 14, and 26 of the ICCPR, Article 
2(2) of the ICESCR, Article 1 of CEDAW, Article 1 of CERD, Article 2 of the CRC, and 
Articles 5 and 12 of the CRPD. The European Court of Human Rights has held that 
Article 14 also prohibits indirect discrimination, understood as the disproportionately 
prejudicial effects of a general policy or measure which, though couched in neutral 
terms, has a particular discriminatory effect on a particular group.38 The ECHR has 
also recognised the following grounds of discrimination as falling within the ambit of 
Article 14: age, health and disability, parental status, immigration status. As we shall 
see below, international treaties mandate a principle of non-discrimination when 
rights are being infringed, even in an emergency context.
Direct and indirect discrimination on various grounds are prohibited in a range of 
European Directives but limited to specified contexts such as employment and 
service provision that are not directly relevant to the subject-matter of this Report. 
The EU Charter for Fundamental Rights, albeit within the limited scope noted above, 
guarantees that everyone is equal before the law.39 It also prohibits discrimination 
based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, 
language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national 
minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation.40
The public body equality obligation
Section 42 of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Act 2014 imposes an 
obligation on public bodies, in the performance of their functions, to have regard to 
the need to eliminate discrimination. ‘Public body’ is broadly defined, and includes 
Departments of State (e.g. the Department of Health), the HSE, any person, body 
or organisation established by or under an enactment (e.g. An Garda Síochána, the 
Chief Medical Officer, and NPHET).41 ‘Discrimination’ is not defined, but section 
2 of the Act provides that ‘discriminate’ and ‘discriminatory grounds’ track the 
meanings of those terms in the EEA and the ESA. The obligation on public bodies to 
have regard to the need to eliminate discrimination therefore includes both direct 
and indirect discrimination on the nine grounds proscribed by those Acts, but not 
limited to the contexts covered by those Acts (employment and service provision).
Section 3 of the ESA prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination on proscribed 
grounds in certain contexts.42 Direct discrimination consists of treating one 
38  DH v Czech Republic (2008) 47 EHRR 3.
39  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art 20.
40  Ibid, Art 21.
41  Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Act, s 2.
42  Equal Status Acts 2000-2015, s 3. In relation to accommodation, a further proscribed ground of 
15 16Ireland’s Emergency Powers During the Covid-19 Pandemic Ireland’s Emergency Powers During the Covid-19 Pandemic
person less favourably than another person in a comparable situation. Indirect 
discrimination occurs where an apparently neutral provision would put a person 
at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless the provision 
is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim 
are appropriate and necessary. The proscribed grounds of discrimination are 
the following: gender, civil status, family status, sexual orientation, religion, age, 
disability, race, and membership of the Traveller community.
In our view, the content of the public body equality obligation is also informed by 
the constitutional, European and international law standards considered in the 
previous section, even in contexts where those standards could not be directly 
invoked by an individual or group against the public body in question.
The following sections outline the relevant international human rights standards 
applicable to particular disadvantaged and vulnerable groups in Irish society in 
the context of the pandemic. The impact of the emergency legislation on these 
categories of persons will be examined later in the Report.
Ethnic, racial, religious, and cultural minorities
The rights of ethnic, racial, religious, and cultural minorities are outlined in Article 
27 of the ICCPR, Articles 2-5 of CERD,43 and Article 30 of the CRC. Article 14 
of the ECHR outlines a general prohibition on discrimination on several named 
grounds, including ‘race’, ‘religion’, ‘national or social origin’, and ‘association with 
a national minority’. This general prohibition is reaffirmed in Article 1 of Protocol 12 
to the ECHR. In addition, the EU ‘Race Directive’ provides for the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin.44
Younger and older People
Children’s rights are specifically referred to in Article 24 of the ICCPR, Article 10(3) 
of the ICESCR, Article 7 of the CRPD, and throughout the CRC. The rights of older 
persons can be identified throughout the CRPD. In addition, Article 21(1) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights expressly prohibits discrimination on basis of age, 
and the rights of older persons to social security and social assistance are provided 
for in Article 34 of the Charter.
discrimination is that one person is in receipt of social welfare payments to support accommodation and the 
other is not. The Programme for Government 2020 commits the Government to examine the introduction of a 
new ground of discrimination based on socio-economic disadvantaged status.
43  The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination recently released its General Recommendation 
No. 36: Preventing and Combatting Racial Profiling by Law Enforcement Officials (CERD/C/GC/36) (24 November 
2020).
44  Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000.
Gender
Gender equality is emphasised in Article 5 of the ECHR, Article 3 of the ICCPR, 
Article 3 of the ICESCR, Article 6 of the CRPD, and throughout CEDAW. Rights 
specific to maternity are outlined in Article 10(2) of the ICESCR, Article 11 of 
CEDAW, the EU ‘Recast Directive’ 45, and the EU ‘Equal Treatment in Goods and 
Services Directive’.46
People with disabilities
The rights of persons with disabilities are emphasised throughout the CRPD, in 
Article 23 of the CRC, and in Article 15 of the European Social Charter.
People living below the poverty line
The right to social security is highlighted in Article 9 of the ICESCR, Article 5(e)(iv) 
of CERD, Article 26 of the CRC, and Article 28 of the CRPD. The European Social 
Charter also provides for the right to social security in Articles 8, 12, and 27, as well 
as outlining a general provision regarding protection against poverty in Article 30.
Conclusion
In this Report, we consider whether the emergency restrictions breach any 
applicable national or international legal standard. But we also consider whether 
various public bodies charged with formulating, implementing and enforcing these 
restrictions have satisfied the Public Sector Equality and Human Rights Duty to have 
regard to the need to eliminate discrimination. We rely on all the legal standards cited 
in this section—in particular the concept of indirect discrimination the full range of 
proscribed grounds identified in various legal instruments, and the disadvantaged 
or vulnerable groups protected by particular instruments—to inform the content of 
that obligation.
Derogations, limitations, and the principle of legality
Ireland has neither declared a state of emergency nor sought to derogate from any 
international human rights to which it is a party. The measures considered in this 
Report must therefore be assessed against the standard criteria of justification for 
restrictions of rights.
45  Directive 2006/54/EC of 5 July 2006.
46  Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004.
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Rights in the Irish constitutional order are not absolute and, even if engaged, can 
be found to be justifiably limited by a statute, regulation or other state action. 
Although the constitutional text often authorises limitations in specific terms, 
the precise formula used is not critical. With a small number of exceptions, 
rights limitations under the Irish Constitution are assessed by means of the 
proportionality test.47 This test asks if measures limiting rights have a legitimate 
objective; if the means of pursuing that objective are rationally connected to that 
objective; if the measures impair rights as little as possible; and if the effects on 
rights are proportionate to the public good achieved by the measure. Where a law 
restricts rights to protect another right, the courts require only that the Oireachtas 
has reasonably and fairly balanced the constitutional rights.48 As many measures 
considered in this Report seek to vindicate citizens’ positive rights to life, health, 
and bodily integrity, they are relatively easy to justify.
The Council of Europe has emphasised that where a state is not formally entering 
a derogation from the ECHR, but instead restricting rights to pursue a policy of 
public health during a health emergency, respect for the rule of law and democratic 
principles will continue to be paramount. This includes (a) adherence to the 
principle of legality, which requires that states adopt measures in accordance with 
the law.49 It also requires that (b) emergency measures adopted must be of limited 
duration, the State returning to a situation of normalcy as swiftly as possible.50 
The scope of emergency legislation must be (c) limited, proportionate, and the 
measures must be necessary. States should attempt to achieve their objectives 
with a ‘minimal alteration of the normal rules and procedures of democratic 
decision-making’.51 Finally, there must be (d) checks on executive action 
throughout the situation of emergency. In practice, this means that parliament 
must continue to possess the power to control executive action, ‘in particular by 
verifying, at reasonable intervals, whether the emergency powers are still justified’, 
and judges should remain in a position to examine the most serious limitations of 
human rights in emergency legislation.52
Where a state is not in the midst of a public emergency, limitations on many rights 
contained within the ICCPR are still permissible. According to the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), such restrictions 
must meet a number of important requirements. First, they must adhere to the 
principle of (a) legality. That is, the restriction must be provided by law. It must not be 
arbitrary or unreasonable and it must be clear and accessible to the general public.53 
47  Heaney v Ireland [1994] 3 IR 593.
48  Tuohy v Courtney [1994] 3 IR 1.
49  Council of Europe, ‘Respecting Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights in the Framework of the 
Covid-19 Sanitary Crisis’ SG/Inf (2020) 11 (7 April 2020), 3.
50  ibid 3.
51  ibid 4.
52  ibid.
53  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Topics in Focus|Emergency Measures and 
COVID-19: Guidance’ (OHCHR 27 April 2020), 1.
The second requirement is that of (b) necessity, meaning that the restriction must be 
‘necessary for the protection of one of the permissible grounds stated in the ICCPR, 
which include public health, and must respond to a pressing social need’.54 The 
restriction must be (c) proportionate to the objective, that is, ‘it must be appropriate 
to achieve its protective function’ and ‘it must be the least intrusive option among 
those that might achieve the desired result’.55 Moreover, the limitation must be (d) 
non-discriminatory. Additionally, limitations should be interpreted strictly and in 
favour of the right at issue, and no limitation may be applied arbitrarily.56 Finally, ‘the 
authorities have the burden of justifying restrictions upon rights’.57
Article 4 of the ICESCR provides that states may place limitations on Covenant 
rights ‘as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the 
nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in 
a democratic society’.
Even if a state is formally entering a derogation under an international human 
rights treaty, certain core rights and obligations are ‘non-derogable’, including 
the right to life, the prohibitions on torture and slavery, freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, and the principle of legality in the criminal law.58
We saw above that indirect discrimination occurs where an apparently neutral 
provision would put one person, identified by a proscribed ground, at a particular 
disadvantage compared with other persons, unless the provision is objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate 
and necessary. This ground of justification is broadly similar to the grounds for 
justifying legislative restrictions of rights in the Constitution, the ECHR, the ICCPR, 
and the ICESR. Similarly, under the ECHR, discrimination may be permitted where 
it is objectively justified, in the sense of pursuing a legitimate aim and employing 
means that are reasonably proportionate to that aim.
Conclusion  
This analysis establishes the following framework for our later human rights and 
equality analysis. In Part II of the Report, we assess the extent to which these 
human rights and equality standards have been considered in the formulation of 
the State’s response to COVID-19. This is relevant to all actors, but particularly to 
those—such as the HSE, the Department of Health, the Chief Medical Officer and 
NPHET—who are subject to the Public Sector Equality and Human Rights Duty.
54  ibid 1.
55  ibid.
56  ibid 2.
57  ibid.
58  For example, non-derogable rights in the context of the ICCPR are outlined in Article 4(2) of that 
Covenant.
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In Part III of the Report, we consider whether the restrictions and their 
enforcement illegitimately interfere with any of the protected rights identified in 
this chapter. In many cases, the obligation on the State to protect public health 
provides a broad justification. Our analysis does not conclude at that point. We 
separately consider whether the State’s response respects the rule of law. Finally, 
given the various equality obligations considered above as well as the principle 
in international human rights law that the principle of non-discrimination applies 
to rights limitations, we assess whether the restrictions or their enforcement 
disproportionately affect disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, as identified either 
by proscribed grounds of discrimination or by sectoral international human rights 
treaties to which Ireland has committed.





Although Ireland did not declare a formal state of emergency to respond to 
COVID-19—public health not being a stated reason for invoking the emergency 
powers in Article 28 of the Constitution—its response bears some of the hallmarks of 
emergency thinking, with a heavy reliance on Government action. Specifically, Ireland’s 
response to COVID-19 has largely been implemented through secondary legislation 
made by the Minister for Health, underpinned by four primary statutes. At the start of 
the pandemic in March, the Oireachtas enacted the Health (Preservation and Protection 
and other Emergency Measures in the Public Interest) Act 2020 (Health Preservation Act). 
Ancillary enforcement measures were authorised in the Criminal Justice (Enforcement 
Powers) (Covid-19) Act 2020 (Enforcement Powers Act) (September), and the Health 
(Amendment) Act 2020 (Health Amendment Act) (October). Also in March, the 
Oireachtas enacted the Emergency Measures in the Public Interest (Covid-19) Act 2020 
(Emergency Measures Act) which provided broad statutory powers to deal with the 
harsh economic and social effects of the pandemic, as well as changing the procedures 
for authorising detention under the Mental Health Act 2001.
In this chapter, we first outline how the Health Preservation Act grants powers 
to the Minister for Health to make regulations to respond to COVID-19. We 
then outline the enforcement powers contained in the statutes. This lays the 
groundwork for chapter 3, in which we outline the restrictions that have actually 
been imposed and how they can be enforced. We then consider two discrete 
powers for the deprivation of liberty. We conclude with a consideration of sunset 
clauses and the manner in which the statutes have been extended.
Grant of legislative power
The preamble to the Health Preservation Act acknowledges that it provides for 
‘extraordinary measures and safeguards to prevent, minimise, limit or slow the risk 
of persons being infected’ and linked its necessity to the ‘constitutional duty of the 
State to respect and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the 
rights of citizens to life and to bodily integrity’.
Part III amended the Health Act 1947 to confer on the Minister for Health powers 
to make regulations ‘for preventing, limiting, minimising or slowing the spread of 
Covid-19’ and ‘where otherwise necessary, to deal with public health risks arising 
from the spread of Covid-19’.59 The Act gives a long but non-exhaustive list of 
what may be covered by such regulations, including the following:
 • restrictions on travel to, from or within the State;
59  Health Act 1947, s 31A(1).
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 • requiring people to remain in their homes;
 • prohibiting events;
 • requiring safeguards to be put in place by event organisers;
 • requiring safeguards to be put in place by the owners or occupiers of 
premises or places, including temporary closures;
 • requiring safeguards to be put in place by the managers of schools, 
childcare facilities and universities; and
 • any other measures that the Minister considers necessary in order 
to prevent, limit, minimise or slow the spread of COVID-19.
These broad powers have equipped the Minister to respond to the pandemic 
and improved knowledge about how COVID-19 is spread. While most of the 
restrictions—as we shall see in chapter 3—were contemplated at the time of 
enactment, the statutory grant of power was sufficiently broad to allow the 
introduction of obligations to wear face coverings, a step not apparently envisaged 
in March 2020.
When making regulations, the Minister is required to consider the general public 
health situation, the need to act expeditiously, the resources of the health system, 
the financial resources of the State, and the advice of the Chief Medical Officer 
of the Department of Health.60 The Minister may have regard to any relevant 
guidance issued by bodies such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control.61 The Minister must also 
consult other Ministers of the Government who hold relevant functions, and may 
consult any other person he considers appropriate.62
Delegation of legislative power is only constitutionally permissible where the 
statute deals with matters of principle and policy, leaving matters of detail to 
the secondary legislator—in this case the Minister for Health—although the 
courts do not apply this test strictly.63 Although the powers delegated by the 
Health Preservation Act are extensive, the Act—in our view—identifies sufficient 
principles and policies to amount to a constitutional delegation of legislative 
power.
60  ibid s 31A(2)(a).
61  Health Act 1947, s 31A(2)(b).
62  ibid s 31A(3).
63  For the courts’ approach to the delegation of legislative power, see Oran Doyle and Tom Hickey, 
Constitutional Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2nd ed, Clarus Press 2019), chapter 8.
Enforcement powers – penal provisions
When the Minister makes regulations under the Health Act, he or she may deem 
particular provisions to be ‘penal provisions.’64 These provisions can then be 
criminally enforced in the following ways.
Breach of a penal provision is a criminal offence, punishable by a fine of up to 
€2,500 and/or up to six months’ imprisonment.65 The Health Amendment Act has 
adjusted these penalties as of 26 October 2020. For a first or second offence, 
the punishment is limited to a fine of up to €1,000 or €1,500 and/or up to one 
month’s or three months’ imprisonment respectively. However, a court can impose 
the full penalty—even for a first or second offence—if there are aggravating 
circumstances. In determining this, the court must have regard to the number 
of people attending the event (if relevant), the degree of danger to public health, 
and the extent to which the defendant refused to comply with lawful directions or 
requests of a Garda.
A Garda who suspects, with reasonable cause, that a person is contravening or 
has contravened a penal provision may direct the person to take such steps as the 
Garda considers necessary to comply with the provision.66 A person who, without 
lawful authority or reasonable excuse, fails to comply with a Garda’s direction shall 
be guilty of an offence.67 A Garda may arrest, without warrant, a person who they 
have reasonable cause for believing is failing or has failed to comply with such a 
direction.68
Enforcement powers – providing name and address
If a Garda has reasonable grounds for believing that a person is committing or has 
committed an offence, the Garda may require the person to state their name and 
address.69 It is an offence to fail to provide a name and address or to provide a false 
name or address.70 A Garda may arrest without warrant a person whom who they 
have reasonable cause for believing is committing or has committed this offence.71
Enforcement powers – relevant persons
The Minister may designate people as ‘relevant persons’ for the purposes of 
64  Health Act 1947, s 31A(6).
65  ibid s 31A(12).
66  Health Act 1947, s 31A(7).
67  ibid s 31A(8)(a).
68  ibid s 31A(8)(b).
69  ibid s 31A(9).
70  ibid s 31A(10).
71  ibid s 31A(11).
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implementing and enforcing the regulations.72 The relevant person may require 
a Garda to assist him or her in exercising a power or performing a function 
under the Act.73 This assistance could involve detaining a person, bringing a 
person to a particular place, or breaking open a premises. The Act provides 
an illustrative list of officials who could be designated as relevant persons, 
including an officer of the Minister for Justice and Equality and a medical officer 
of health.
Enforcement powers – pubs
The Enforcement Powers Act introduced a wide range of enforcement powers in 
respect of premises where intoxicating liquor is sold or supplied for consumption 
on the premises.74 These powers essentially allow the Gardaí to inspect such 
premises without a warrant, issue immediate closure orders, and/or seek closure 
orders from the District Court. These powers lie beyond the scope of this Report, 
given our focus—as explained in the introduction—on measures that directly 
affect individuals in their everyday lives as distinct from measures that affect 
commercial interests.
Enforcement powers – fixed penalty provisions
The Health Amendment Act allows the Minister for Health to designate penal 
provisions as fixed penalty provisions.75 Regulations to this effect came into 
force on 22 November 2020. If a Garda has reasonable grounds for believing that 
a person has contravened a fixed penalty provision, he or she may serve a fixed 
penalty notice on the person. If the person pays the penalty, which cannot be more 
than €500, within 28 days, no prosecution will proceed.
Enforcement powers – dwelling event provisions
The Health Amendment Act allows the Minister for Health to designate penal 
provisions as dwelling event provisions.76 Regulations to this effect came 
into force on 22 November 2020. This designation generates two important 
enforcement powers. First, if a Garda has reasonable grounds for believing that 
a person is in a public place with an intent to, or is about to, or is attempting to 
enter a dwelling in contravention of a dwelling provision, he or she can issue 
a direction to the person leave the place and vicinity. Second, if a Garda has 
72  ibid s 31A(13).
73  ibid s 31A(14).
74  Health Act 1947, section 31A(6A).
75  ibid s 31C.
76  ibid s 31D.
reasonable grounds for believing that an event is taking place in contravention 
of a dwelling provision, he or she can direct the occupier to cause everyone 
attending the event to leave the dwelling and the vicinity, other than those who 
live there. The Garda is permitted to attend at the main entrance to the dwelling 
and to require the occupier to provide his or her name. It is an offence to fail to 
comply with a direction of a Garda, without reasonable excuse. This criminal 




Part 5 of the Emergency Measures Act made amendments to the Mental Health 
Act 2001. It permits the Mental Health Commission to request an independent 
psychiatric report about an involuntary patient from any consultant psychiatrist 
who is not treating the patient, and not just those on its designated panel as 
would usually occur. This independent examination may occur ‘in person’, ‘by 
other appropriate means’, or even, ‘due to the exigencies of the public health 
emergency’, not occur at all, once this is explained in the resultant report. The 
Emergency Measures Act 2020 Act permits the Mental Health Commission to, if 
necessary, appoint tribunals ‘consisting of one member who shall be a practising 
barrister or solicitor’. Such a tribunal shall, if possible, consult with a consultant 
psychiatrist if the reports from the independent psychiatrist and treating 
psychiatrist conflict or if it is otherwise ‘necessary in the interest of the patient’. 
A tribunal can extend an involuntary order by a second period of 14 days ‘of its 
own motion if the tribunal, having due regard to the interest of the patient, is 
satisfied that it is necessary’.
Detention and isolation for disease control
The Health Preservation Act allows for the detention and isolation of persons 
in order to prevent, limit, minimise or slow the spread of COVID-19.77 Several 
conditions must be satisfied before this power can be exercised, including that the 
person be both a potential source of infection and risk to public health, and that 
they cannot be effectively isolated or refuse to remain / appear unlikely to remain 
in their home. We are unaware of these powers being exercised and therefore do 
not consider them further in this Report.78
77  Health Act 1947, s 38A.
78  It should be noted that, as of the end of January 2021, there is no current legal basis for instituting 
mandatory quarantine for those entering Ireland. Should the Government seek to implement this policy, it will 
almost certainly require new primary legislation. The depravation of liberty involved here would be acute, and 
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Sunset provisions
Overview
‘Sunsetting’ ensures that the legal effect of a statutory provision will expire 
or ‘sunset’ at a certain point in time. A variation is that the legal effect will 
expire unless a specified actor is satisfied that certain conditions are satisfied 
and extends the provision. As noted in chapter 1, the principle of legality 
in international human rights law favours the use of sunset clauses where 
extraordinary powers are adopted to respond to an emergency situation. Such 
provisions ensure that exceptional powers are not retained indefinitely, but only for 
the circumstances they were introduced to tackle in the first place. The pandemic 
legislation, given its unusual nature, extraordinary scope, and the very significant 
discretion given to Ministers, requires robust sunsetting provisions that are taken 
seriously by the Government.
The relevant powers in the Health Preservation Act, Emergency Powers Act and 
Enforcement Powers Act were all provided to remain in force until 9 November 
2020, unless, before that date, a resolution approving its continuation had been 
passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas.79 A motion to renew the powers in the 
Health Preservation Act was laid before the Dáil on 22 October 2020.80 There was 
some controversy when it was planned to allot only 45 minutes of Oireachtas time 
to debate on this motion.81 Even when given a somewhat longer period, deputies 
complained of inadequate time.82 The motion also extended the powers for a 
significant period, until 9 June 2021, which several TDs objected to, suggesting 
shorter extensions.83 In the end, the motion passed with 92 votes in favour and 53 
against. The relevant powers in the Emergency Measures Act and the Enforcement 
merit detailed scrutiny for its proportionality.
79  Health Preservation Act, s2, Emergency Powers Act, s1(3), Enforcement Powers Act, s17(3).
80  Dáil Order Paper 22 October 2020, vol 60, no 585. See ‘Motion re Extension of Sunset Clause for Part 3 of 
the Health (Preservation and Protection and other Emergency Measures in the Public Interest) Act 2020’.
81  Jack Horgan-Jones, ‘Extra day to Dáil debate on extending State’s powers during pandemic’, The Irish 
Times (Dublin, 20 October 2020).
82  Dáil Deb 22 October 2020, vol 999, no 7. See comments of Michael McNamara TD and Mattie McGrath 
TD. As the former put it, at p.881, ‘giving Deputies 50 seconds each to debate what is the most fundamental 
set of restrictions to rights in this State in its history is not democracy’.
83  ibid see comments of Alan Kelly TD (at p. 832) and David Cullinane TD (at p.843).
 ʥ  The pandemic legislation, given its unusual nature, 
extraordinary scope, and the very significant discretion 
given to Ministers, requires robust sunsetting 
provisions that are taken seriously by the Government.
Powers Act were similarly extended until 9 June 2021. An amendment to limit 
the extension to February 2021 in the latter case was moved but failed to pass. 
The powers under the Health Amendment Act, adopted in late October 2020, 
extend until 9 June 2021.84 Powers under all Acts can then be extended again by 
resolutions of both Houses of the Oireachtas.
Sunsetting is a crucial measure, required under international human rights law, for 
ensuring that rights restrictions adopted in an emergency do not extend for longer 
than is warranted. We shall see in chapter 4 that these concerns were to the fore 
among legislators when initially delegating significant powers to the Minister for 
Health to make regulations responding to the pandemic. However, these sunset 
provisions have not imposed significant constraints. The Government, supported 
by a clear majority in both Houses, has been able to secure lengthy extensions to 
all powers. It would be better if shorter extensions had been sought—opposition 
calls for initial extension to February rather than June 2021 seem sensible—rather 
than very lengthy extensions of this sort. The legislation itself would ideally specify 
the maximum length of any extension: three months would be a reasonable 
period that would balance the Government’s need to plan with the imperative of 
democratic oversight.
Conclusion  
In this chapter, we have identified three aspects of the State’s statutory response 
to COVID-19. First, we identified the statutory provisions that enable the Minister 
for Health to make regulations restricting and prohibiting certain activities. 
Second, we identified the statutory provisions that establish a set of enforcement 
mechanisms for those restrictions and prohibitions. Third, we identified the 
statutory provisions that directly authorise deprivation of liberty, most notably 
those that allow for detention on mental health grounds. In the next chapter, 
we identify the prohibitions and restrictions that the Minister for Health has 
introduced by regulation, as well as the enforcement powers applied in respect of 
each of them.
84  Health Amendment Act, s6.
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Chapter 3
The Restrictions and 
their Enforcement
Introduction
In this chapter, we outline the restrictions on ordinary life that have been 
introduced to control the spread of the virus, and how these restrictions can 
be enforced. We first consider the stable restrictions that apply in respect of 
international passengers and face coverings. We then examine the considerably 
more complicated and frequently changing restrictions that apply to personal 
movement, gatherings, events, etc. We conclude by drawing together an analysis 
of how enforcement powers apply in relation to the restrictions. The aim is not to 
provide a legally comprehensive account of the restrictions that have applied at 
any particular time. Rather, we present a picture of those restrictions that are most 
salient from a human rights and equality perspective.
International arrivals
There were no restrictions on international arrivals during the early stages of the 
pandemic. The COVID-19 Passenger Locator Form Regulations were made by the 
Minister for Health on 24 May 2020.85 The initial expiry date for the regulations was 
18 June 2020, but they have been extended on several occasions and are currently 
in force until 9 June 2021. These have been accompanied and supplemented by 
more wide-ranging advice, an issue that we address later in chapter 8.86
The core obligations in the regulations are for international passengers (with some 
exceptions), on or before their arrival to the State, to complete the COVID-19 
Passenger Locator Form (PLF) in respect of themselves or any children.87 Originally 
paper-based, since 26 August 2020 the obligation has been to show an electronic 
‘PLF receipt’ to an immigration officer.88 The form seeks information about how 
international passengers arrived in the State and details of their place of residence 
for the following 14 days. If they change their place of residence or contact details, 
they must make reasonable efforts to provide this updated information in writing.89 
They must comply with any request from an immigration officer or member of 
the HSE COVID-19 Contact Management Programme to provide information or 
documentation to verify and clarify the particulars in the form or, after their arrival, 
to confirm where they are actually residing.90
85  Health Act 1947 (Section 31A -Temporary Requirements) (Covid-19 Passenger Locator Form) Regulations 
2020, SI 181/2020.
86  We note that requirements for international travel changed after the initial writing of this Report 
was concluded: flights from the UK were stopped for a period of time; negative PCR tests were required 
from travellers entering from certain countries (SI 11/2021); and broader restrictions, such as mandatory 
quarantine, are under discussion.
87  ibid reg 5.
88  Health Act 1947 (Section 31A – Temporary Requirements) (Covid-19 Passenger Locator Form) 
(Amendment) (No. 6) Regulations 2020, SI 314/2020, reg 8.
89  SI 181/2020, reg 6(5).
90  ibid reg 6.
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Face covering requirements
The requirement to wear face coverings on public transport was introduced on 
13 July 2020.91 Originally scheduled to last until 5 October 2020, this has been 
extended to 9 June 2021.92 The core obligation is not to travel on public transport 
without wearing a face covering, unless one has a reasonable excuse.93 There is 
a non-exhaustive list of reasonable excuses, including an inability to wear a face 
covering due to illness.94 The obligation does not apply to children under the age of 
13, or to drivers in their own compartment or separated by screens.95
Officers, employees and agents of public transport operators and the National 
Transport Agency are deemed to be ‘relevant persons’.96 This means that, under 
the Health Act, they may require Gardaí to provide them with assistance, including 
by detaining a person.97 Under the regulations, they may request a passenger to 
wear a face covering, refuse the passenger entry, or request the passenger to 
alight. Before doing so, they must give the passenger an opportunity to provide 
a reasonable excuse, if necessary, supported by documentation. Any failure 
by a passenger to comply with a request or refusal is a criminal offence (penal 
provision). Since 22 November 2020, a fixed penalty notice of €80 may be issued 
for an alleged breach of this provision.98
An equivalent obligation in relation to certain businesses and premises came into 
effect on 10 August 2020, originally scheduled to last until 5 October but now 
extended to 9 June 2021.99 The premises in which you must wear face coverings 
include shops, libraries, and hairdressers.100 The obligation does not apply to 
restaurants, nor to medical and dental services.101 The core obligation is the 
same as applies in respect of public transport: not to enter or remain in one of the 
specified premises without wearing a face covering unless you have a reasonable 
excuse.102 However, in this context, the failure to wear a face covering is itself a 
penal provision.103 Since 22 November 2020, a fixed penalty notice of €80 may be 
91  Health Act 1947 (Section 31A -Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) (Face Coverings on Public Transport) 
Regulations 2020, SI 244/2020.
92  We note that additional requirements for face covering were introduced after the initial writing of this 
Report was concluded, with post offices, credit unions, and banks now included in premises requiring such 
coverings (SI 20/2021), as well as bus stations and rail stations (SI 21/2021).
93  ibid reg 5(1).
94  ibid reg 6.
95  ibid reg 5(2).
96  ibid reg 4.
97  Health Act 1947, s 31A (13)-(14). See discussion in chapter 2.
98  SI 536/2020 Fixed Payment Notice and Dwelling Event Regulations 2020, reg 3 and sch1, para 1.
99  Health Act 1947 (Section 31A – Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) (Face Coverings in Certain Premises 
and Businesses) Regulations 2020, SI 296/2020.
100  ibid reg 3 and Part A of the Schedule.
101  ibid reg 3(c).
102  ibid reg 4(1).
103  ibid reg 4(3).
issued for an alleged breach of this provision.104 There is also an obligation on the 
occupier, manager, or person in charge to take reasonable steps to inform those 
entering the premises of their obligations and to encourage compliance.105
Restrictions on ordinary life – overview
The Government has used the powers granted by the Health Preservation Act to 
impose significant restrictions on ordinary life. These restrictions can, thus far, be 
divided into six stages, which we label A-F:
 • Stage A—Total Lockdown: 8 April 2020 to 8 June 2020;
 • Stage B—Easing Lockdown: 8 June 2020 to 29 June 2020;
 • Stage C—Eased Lockdown: 29 June 2020 to 31 August 2020, although 
not in every county;
 • Stage D—Modified Lockdown: 31 August 2020 to 7 October, although 
not in every county;
 • Stage E—Tightened Lockdown: 7 October to 22 October, although 
Kildare, Laois, Offaly, Dublin and Donegal were in this stage earlier; and
 • Stage F–Renewed Lockdown–7 October 2020 to 30 November 2020.106
We adopt this labelling rather than the Government’s phases and levels for two 
reasons. First, the Government’s labels have not applied over the entirety of the 
pandemic response. Second, the change in phases or levels for the Government 
has been as much about changing public health advice as changing the law. For this 
Report, it is the change in legal measures that is critically important.
104  SI 536/2020 Fixed Payment Notice and Dwelling Event Regulations 2020, reg 3 and sch1, para 2.
105  ibid reg 4(4).
106  The measures adopted since 30 November 2020 have broadly replicated these stages. The relaxation 
in December, which saw hospitality and retail reopen and eventually visits to homes around Christmas, 
resembled stages D and E. Shortly after Christmas, a renewed lockdown was once again introduced, 
resembling Stage F. With the additional closure of schools, the situation in January has most closely resembled 
Stage A, but with some differences.
 ʥ  Because the list of reasonable excuses was non-
exhaustive, it was possible to leave your home for other 
reasons as well, but there was considerable uncertainty 
as to what those reasons might be.
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Stage A – total lockdown
During Stage A, it was a criminal offence to leave your home without a reasonable 
excuse.107 A non-exhaustive list of reasonable excuses included going to an essential 
retail outlet,108 and obtaining money for yourself or a vulnerable person,109 Some 
classes of reasonable excuse were broadened during this period. For instance, it was 
initially permitted to leave your home to exercise only within a 2 kilometre radius 
and only with other residents in your home.110 This was ultimately extended to 
allow exercise within a 5 kilometre radius with others from your home or up to three 
others from outside your home.111 Because the list of reasonable excuses was non-
exhaustive, it was possible to leave your home for other reasons as well, but there 
was considerable uncertainty as to what those reasons might be.112
Stage B – easing lockdown
In Stage B, it was generally permissible to leave your house and move around the 
country. However, if you were leaving your house solely for social or recreational 
purposes, including leisure or holiday purposes, there were limitations, although 
they were not criminally enforceable. You could do so within 20 kilometres of your 
home or within the county in which your home was situated.113 Exercise had to 
be outdoors; social and recreational activities could take place indoors. Outdoor 
activities could involve no more than 15 people; indoor activities no more than six 
people.114 You were also allowed to visit the residence of a vulnerable person for 
social or recreational purposes, but subject again to a limit of 6 people.115
Stage C – eased lockdown
From the end of June until the end of August 2020, there were restrictions on 
events and on businesses that sold intoxicating liquor for consumption on the 
premises.116 There were no direct restrictions on the activities of individuals.
107  Health Act 1947 (Section 31A -Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) Regulations 2020, SI 121/2020, reg 4.
108  ibid reg 4(2)(c).
109  ibid reg 4(2)(d).
110  ibid 4(2)(i).
111  Health Act 1947 (Section 31A – Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 
2020, SI 174/2020, reg 5(c).
112  Chapters 8 and 9 address the implications of this vagueness from a human rights and equality 
perspective.
113  Health Act 1947 (Section 31A - Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) (No. 2) Regulations 2020, SI 
206/2020, reg 5.
114  ibid reg 6.
115  ibid reg 6(3).
116 Health Act 1947 (Section 31A – Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) (No. 3) Regulations 2020, SI 
234/2020, reg 5.
Stage D – modified eased lockdown
At the end of August 2020, restrictions were imposed on events in private 
dwellings, with no more than six people from no more than three households 
allowed to attend.117 These were not penal provisions. Stricter number limits than 
before were applied to indoor and outdoor events.118 50 people were allowed to 
attend wedding receptions.119 Detailed rules regulated the activities of businesses 
that sold intoxicating liquor, although on 21 September 2020, wet pubs were 
removed from the list of premises to which access was prohibited outside 
Dublin.120 On the same day, the Minister for Health applied the enforcement 
powers in the Enforcement Powers Act to the provisions of the regulations that 
controlled activities in licensed premises and clubs.121
Stage E – tightened lockdown
Stage E began with county-specific lockdowns: Kildare, Laois, and Offaly in August; 
Dublin and Donegal in September 2020. Somewhat different approaches were 
followed in August and September, reflecting changes in the background country-
wide restrictions. Common to both was a prohibition on entering or leaving a 
lockdown county, without a reasonable excuse. The enumerated reasonable 
excuses were broadly similar to those that permitted you to leave your home 
during Stage A Total Lockdown. But these were not penal provisions. In August, 
events and funerals were limited to six people indoors and 25 people outdoors. 
Limitations were also imposed on the number of people who could gather 
indoors or outdoors for social or recreational purposes. Access to a wide range of 
businesses and premises was prohibited.
Dublin and Donegal entered Stage E at different points in September, followed 
by the rest of the country at the start of October 2020. The most significant 
restrictions were as follows, with penal provisions specifically identified:
 • A prohibition on leaving one’s county of residence or the State without 
reasonable excuse;122
 • Initially, only six persons from one other household could attend an 
117  Health Act 1947 (Section 31A – Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) (No.4) Regulations 2020, SI 
326/2020, reg 5.
118  ibid reg 6.
119  ibid reg 8.
120  Health Act 1947 (Section 31A - Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) (No. 5) (Amendment) Regulations 
2020, SI 353/2020.
121  Health Act 1947 (Section 31A(6A)) (Covid-19) Regulations 2020, SI 354/2020.
122  Health Act 1947 (Section 31A - Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) (No.6) Regulations 2020, SI 
413/2020, reg 5.
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event in a private dwelling; 123 later, events were limited to those living in 
the dwelling;124
 • Social, recreational, exercise, cultural, entertainment or community 
events could only be organised outdoors, with a limit of 15 people.125 
This was a penal provision;
 • Wedding receptions were limited to 25 people; 126 and
 • Funerals were limited to 25 people.127
On 19 October 2020, the counties of Cavan, Donegal and Monaghan were placed 
on a slightly higher level of restrictions.128
Stage F – renewed lockdown
On 22 October 2020, Ireland returned to a lockdown similar to that which had 
been in place during Stage A.129 It was again a criminal offence to leave one’s home 
without a reasonable excuse, with a non-exhaustive list of reasonable excuses 
provided, for example exercise within a 5 kilometre radius of the home.130 Although 
in similar terms to the list applicable during Stage A, some new excuses were 
added, such as attending school or university,131 and accessing childcare.132 Since 
22 November 2020, a fixed penalty notice of €100 may be issued for an alleged 
breach of this provision.133
During Stage F, events in dwellings were not permitted to include persons from 
outside the dwelling. This was not initially deemed to be a penal provision.134 
However, a new innovation was the ‘paired household’, which allowed a household 
with at least one vulnerable person and no more than one non-vulnerable person 
to pair with another household, thereby allowing members of each household to 
123  ibid reg 6
124  Health Act 1947 (Section 31A - Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) (No. 7) Regulations 2020, SI 
442/2020, reg 6.
125  Child Care (Placement of Children with Relatives) (Emergency Measures in the Public Interest - 
Covid-19) (Amendment) (No.1) Regulations 2020, SI 313/2020, reg 7.
126  SI 413/2020, reg 8.
127  SI 313/2020, reg 7.
128  SI 442/2020.
129  Health Act 1947 (Section 31A - Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) (No. 8) Regulations 2020, SI 
448/2020.
130  ibid reg 5.
131  ibid reg 5(2)(d).
132  ibid reg 5(2)(f).
133  SI 536/2020 Fixed Payment Notice and Dwelling Event Regulations 2020, reg 3 and sch1, para 3.
134  SI 448/2020, reg 6.
attend events in the other home.135 On 22 November 2020, a series of changes 
were made to allow greater enforcement of these provisions. The organisation of 
an event in a dwelling was made a criminal offence,136 with a fixed penalty notice 
of €500 attached.137 A separate prohibition was introduced on attending an event 
in a dwelling,138 with a fixed penalty notice of €150 attached.139 The dwelling event 
provisions were also applied to these prohibitions on 22 November 2020.140
Beyond this, events were only permitted where outdoors and where attended 
by persons from no more than two households.141 The organisation of, but 
not participation in, events which did not meet the foregoing exception was 
criminalised.142 Since 22 November 2020, a fixed penalty notice of €500 may be 
issued for an alleged breach of this provision.143 Funerals and wedding receptions 
fell into a different category, with 25 people permitted to attend these events.144
Although the legal regulation of shopping was the same in Stage F as Stage A, 
it became the subject of public debate in Stage F. It was a reasonable excuse to 
leave one’s home to go to an essential retail outlet for ‘the purpose of obtaining 
items (including food, beverages, fuel, medicinal products, medical devices or 
appliances, other medical or health supplies or products, essential items for the 
health and welfare of animals, or supplies for the essential upkeep and functioning 
of the person’s place of residence)’.145 This was mirrored by an obligation on shop-
owners only to allow members of the public access to that part of a shop that ‘is 
operating solely as an essential retail outlet.’146 Although the list of items was again 
non-exhaustive, shop owners were unlikely to leave themselves open to criminal 
sanction by allowing customers to purchase items other than those listed.
Religious practice
During stages B-E, there were no legal restrictions on religious practice. During 
stages A and F, it was a reasonable excuse to leave one’s home to attend certain 
funerals.147 Priests were permitted to leave their homes to lead religious services 
135  ibid reg 7. For the definition of ‘relevant household’, see reg 4.
136  SI 535/2020 Health Act 1947 (Section 31A - Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) (No. 8) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2020, reg 2.
137  SI 536/2020 Fixed Payment Notice and Dwelling Event Regulations 2020, reg 3 and sch1, para 5.
138  SI 535/2020 Health Act 1947 (Section 31A - Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) (No. 8) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2020, reg 2.
139  SI 536/2020 Fixed Payment Notice and Dwelling Event Regulations 2020, reg 3 and sch1, para 4.
140  ibid reg 4.
141  SI 448/2020, reg 8.
142  ibid reg 8(4).
143  SI 536/2020 Fixed Payment Notice and Dwelling Event Regulations 2020, reg 3 and sch1, para 6.
144  SI 448/2020, reg 8(3) and reg 9 respectively.
145  ibid reg 5(2)(t).
146  ibid reg 12(2).
147  SI 121/2020, reg 4(2)(k) and SI 448/2020 reg 5(2)(l).
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remotely.148 These strongly implied that it would have been a criminal offence 
to leave one’s home to attend any other form of religious service, although 
the principle that criminal liability must be clear may count against such an 
interpretation. During Stage F, however, religious services did not fall within the 
category of prohibited events.149 The Department of Health expressed the view 
that this meant that priests could not be criminally sanctioned for saying Mass.150 
This would lend support for the view that it would be a reasonable excuse to leave 
one’s home to attend Mass, given that Mass is not criminally prohibited. Despite 
the Department of Health’s (correct) statement that it is not a criminal offence to 
hold a religious service, it has been reported in the media that the Gardaí continue 
to threaten priests with criminal prosecution for saying Mass.151 We return to this 
issue as an instance of indirect enforcement in chapter 9.
Overview of enforcement powers
Penal provisions have generally not applied to private individuals. In Stage A, 
most prohibitions were deemed to be penal provisions. In Stage F, the obligation 
not to leave one’s home without a reasonable excuse is a penal provision, but 
the prohibition on home events only became a penal provision on 22 November 
2020. On the same date, the attendance of events in dwellings became a criminal 
offence, fixed penalty notices were applied to both, and the dwelling event 
provisions were brought into force. The failure to wear a face covering on public 
transport is not a criminal offence, but failure to comply with requests from 
relevant persons is a penal provision. Also, the employee or officer of the public 
transport company or the National Transport Authority can require the Gardaí 
to assist in enforcing the requirements. Failure to wear a face covering in a shop, 
in contrast, is a penal provision. Fixed penalty notice provisions range from €80 
for face covering provisions to €100 for leaving one’s home without a reasonable 
excuse, to €150 for attending an event in a dwelling, to €500 for organising a 
prohibited event in a dwelling or outdoors.
Conclusion  
In this Report, our primary concern is with those regulations that raise human 
rights and equality concerns. In particular, we are concerned with regulations that 
restrict personal liberty, infringe on the dwelling place, or disproportionately affect 
groups identified by proscribed grounds of discrimination under the Equal Status 
148  SI 121/2020, reg 4(2)(o) and SI 448/2020, reg 5(2)(o).
149  SI 448/2020, reg 8.
150  Ceimin Burke, ‘Department of Health says priests can’t be jailed for holding mass during coronavirus 
restrictions’, thejournal.ie, (6 November 2020).
151  Marese McDonagh, ‘Gardaí give “last warning” to parish priest over “open door” Mass’, The Irish Times 
(19 November 2020).
Acts 2000-2015.
The following restrictions are therefore of the most importance for the purposes 
of this Report:
 • Restrictions on leaving one’s home;
 • Restrictions on shopping;
 • Movement restrictions;
 • Restrictions on events or gatherings in one’s home;
 • Restrictions on education;
 • Obligations to wear face coverings;
 • Obligations on international passengers arriving into Ireland; and
 • Restrictions on religious practice.
We now turn to the question of how these measures were introduced, and in 
particular the consideration given to human rights and the interests of vulnerable 
groups.




Human Rights and 
Equality Concerns
Introduction
In considering the Health Preservation Act, the Emergency Powers Act, the 
Enforcement Powers Act, and the Health Amendment Act, members of the 
Oireachtas have had regard to rights and equality concerns in various ways. They 
have tended not to use rights language. In our cataloguing of Oireachtas debates, 
we have not identified any references to international human rights instruments. 
Nevertheless, as we shall see, they have addressed the sort of concerns that 
underly those human rights instruments.
The Health Preservation Act
Many Dáil Deputies and Senators highlighted the potential for the rights restrictions in 
this legislation but nearly all accepted that the Government required extensive statutory 
powers to address the crisis. Instead, the main concern was ensuring the Government’s 
new powers were time-limited, that any extension of their duration should be subject to 
Oireachtas approval, and that Dáil scrutiny would be ongoing during the crisis.
For example, the leader of Sinn Féin, Mary-Lou McDonald, TD, stated that the ‘legislation 
before us affords the Minister extraordinary and far-reaching powers; these are 
extraordinary powers for an extraordinary time. People want to know that these powers 
will be used to protect them… Orderly and decisive action will bring about calm and 
reassurance.’152 Other TDs expressed concern at the scope of the statutory delegation 
but accepted their necessity and were reluctant to oppose them. Co-leader of the Social 
Democrats, Catherine Murphy, TD, did not dispute the necessity of the legislation but 
stated that it had to include a sunset clause as it ‘is not that this legislation is not being 
brought in in good faith and is not being deemed to be needed but one never knows 
where abuse might happen.’153 Richard Boyd Barrett, TD of Solidarity-People Before 
Profit argued that the Oireachtas would have to decide whether to extend the powers 
beyond 9 May 2020; it could not simply be a question of laying an order before the Dáil.154
One of the few deputies to oppose the bill was Mick Barry, TD of the Socialist Party. While 
supportive of much of the Bill, he felt it was too much of a risk:
Governments in this country have a long tradition of using repressive legislation 
for purposes other than its intended use…. I am particularly concerned about the 
establishment of a full-time Garda public order unit, with one of its responsibilities, 
according to the RTÉ website, being to ‘deal with protests’. In France and other 
countries, Covid-19-related emergency legislation has been already used to 
repress dissent but that must not happen here.155
152  Dáil Deb 19 March 2020, vol 992, no 3, p. 183.
153  ibid 234.
154  ibid 197.
155  ibid 199.
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The Emergency Measures Act
Catherine Connolly, Independent TD wished to:
[H]ighlight the serious implications for human rights in both this and the 
previous legislation, and particularly in this legislation with regard to mental 
health…which are extremely worrying… What we have been forced to do 
because of this virus is extraordinary.156
Deputy Connolly added that she had: ‘the most serious concerns about [Part] 5 
… I see that there is a sunset clause, which I welcome, and that the legislation will 
come back before the Dáil for discussion.’ She observed, ‘the extraordinary length 
of time it took to bring human rights into the mental health area and with the 
stroke of a pen we have now taken it away for a period of eight months.’
Brid Smith, TD of Solidarity-PBP stated that she found it ‘an extraordinarily 
draconian measure that a one-person tribunal, made up of a barrister whose 
profession is to deal with legal issues, would make a determination on somebody 
whose mental health was challenged and who was taken against his or her will into 
a mental health institution. I find this really draconian and upsetting.’157
Louise O’Reilly, TD of Sinn Féin also raised concerns, stating that:
To detain someone involuntarily is a very serious undertaking…. The fact 
that a person will not get a review outside of the normal six-month review so 
that when this is over, he or she does not have an automatic entitlement to 
a review is also concerning because the detention could last for six months. 
I do not think there should be any case where a tribunal is allowed to go 
ahead without the presence either remotely or otherwise of a consultant 
psychiatrist or a person who is clinically trained to that level.158
Then Minister for Health, Simon Harris, TD opposed an amendment proposed by 
Sinn Féin to the effect that Mental Health Tribunals must consist of two-persons—
comprising the chair being a solicitor or barrister and a consultant psychiatrist or a 
registered clinical nurse specialist in psychiatry. The amendment was opposed for 
logistical reasons, as the Minister for Health argued that:
The Commission policy decision to adopt a cascading approach to tribunals 
was taken because both the HSE and the commission did express very 
serious concerns over the expected lack of availability of consultant 
psychiatrists due to Covid-19 and my concern is that the two-person tribunal 
would not do anything to alleviate those pressures. I do need to say that in 
156  Dáil Deb 26 March 2020, vol 992, no 4, p. 262.
157  ibid 289.
158  ibid 348.
the case of one-person tribunals—this is really important and I want to say 
it on the record of this House—clinical input would still be given both by the 
treating psychiatrist and an independent consultant psychiatrist and where 
they differ in their opinion, by another psychiatrist. I do need to make that 
clear.159
The Enforcement Powers Act
The Enforcement Powers Act, as we saw in chapter 2, provides various powers for 
the Gardaí to enforce the public health regulations in respect of licenses premises, 
which lies outside the scope of this Report.
Health Amendment Act
As we saw in chapter 2, the Health Amendment Act introduced gradated criminal 
sanctions, gave the Gardaí some powers to disrupt household events, without 
giving them the power to enter homes, and provided for fixed penalty notices. 
Minister for Health Stephen Donnelly, TD, introducing the Bill, said the rationale 
for the Bill was that he did ‘not believe that the current penal provision of up to 
€2,500 and six months in prison is proportionate for most of the violations of the 
regulations and that it is too harsh.’160 He also described the Bill as giving ‘the ability 
to intervene in house parties where there is a public health risk and where it is 
proportionate to do so.’161
Concerns about the Bill focused on a lack of legislative scrutiny over the broad 
power to make regulations given to the Minister for Health and the impact on 
civil liberties, which some felt would be unevenly enforced on socio-economic or 
geographic grounds. Brendan Howlin, TD expressed reservations about the lack of 
Oireachtas oversight of the Minister’s power to make regulations, saying that the:
160 Deputies have been trusted by the people to be their watchdogs, the 
protectors of their rights and interests. We must not only do that, but be 
seen to do it. People must trust what we decide and the processes we use to 
decide. That is not happening with this legislation. It is not good enough. The 
notion that we have legislation that, in essence, simply transfers power to the 
Minister to make regulations is not good.162
Alan Kelly, TD Leader of the Labour Party said he was:
159  ibid 349.
160  Dáil Deb 23 October 2020, vol 999, no 8, p.990-991.
161  ibid 991.
162  ibid 1001.
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[P]leased that An Garda Síochána will not be given the power to enter houses. 
Even though we support the public health efforts, we would not support this 
Bill if that was the case. Gardaí will have the power to knock on the door, ask 
to speak to the organiser and take his or her details as necessary. Given the 
difficult circumstances we are in, this is the right approach. It is balanced 
between civil liberties and the need to enforce the regulation, which gives 
the gardaí the ability to make their presence known without intruding into a 
person’s home.163
Bríd Smith, TD of Solidarity-People before Profit said:
We are totally opposed to imposing fines on people. In fact, they do not 
work. The Irish Council for Civil Liberties has done some good research 
on this. When we used to jail people for not paying their television licence 
fees, the jails were full of mainly single mothers who could not afford to pay 
their television licence fine and would go to jail for a day or two instead. The 
Minister may find that this will happen. This approach does not work and is 
ineffective but, most important, it sends out the signal that we are not all in 
this together.164
Independent Thomas Pringle, TD voted against the bill, asking:
What data are being collected on the locations being policed? What is the 
socio-economic status of those being stopped and questioned by gardaí? 
The public has been rightly sceptical about the Government’s focus on house 
parties and personal responsibility, while ignoring the grave problems in meat 
processing plants and direct provision centres.165
163  ibid 999.
164  ibid 1011.
165  ibid 1030.
 ʥ  Concerns about the Bill focused on a lack of legislative 
scrutiny over the broad power to make regulations 
given to the Minister for Health and the impact on civil 
liberties, which some felt would be unevenly enforced 
on socio-economic or geographic grounds. 
Conclusion  
The members of the Oireachtas, while accepting the public health rationale for 
the statutes, were concerned about the human rights and equality implications. 
There was a nuanced engagement with the complex trade-offs between 
protecting public health and respecting individual liberties, rights, and the need for 
Oireachtas oversight. Proportionality, whether expressly or implicitly, was given 
repeated consideration in these debates. These implications were not articulated 
in the language of the legal instruments that we identified in chapter 1. This is 
not problematic in itself: such language is technical, legal and stylised. Elected 
politicians should be able to speak in political terms, not legal terms. Nevertheless, 
formal consideration of human rights and equality concerns as an input into the 
legislative process would be welcome. This may have been difficult at the start 
of the pandemic when the Health Preservation Act and the Emergency Powers Act 
were enacted. However, for the more recent statutes—the Enforcement Powers 
Act and the Health Amendment Act—this could have been possible.
Though there are many ways that human rights scrutiny might be provided, in 
our view, the best way to ensure such scrutiny would be the establishment of a 
Joint Oireachtas Committee on Equality, Human Rights and Diversity. IHREC has 
recommended such a body since 2016, and has raised this issue specifically in the 
context of the COVID-19 crisis.166 This Committee would be adequately resourced 
to allow members engage properly with the full range of relevant standards, 
including but not limited to those identified in chapter 1 of this report. Only in such 
a way can structured, cross-departmental analysis of the legislation be brought 
to bear. All Bills related to the control of the pandemic would be referred to that 
committee, but we recommend further roles for the Committee in subsequent 
chapters.
It is striking—although it should not be surprising—that human rights and equality 
concerns were expressed far more systematically in relation to the statutes 
that made legislative choices—whether by providing enforcement powers or 
adjusting the procedures for detention of people believed to be mentally ill–than 
for legislation that delegated legislative power to the Minister for Health. In the 
debates on the enactment of the statute, human rights and equality concerns 
could not easily be raised about the substance of restrictions because it was, at 
best, unclear what those restrictions would be. For that legislation, members 
of the Oireachtas could only advance procedural concerns about the need for 
continuing parliamentary oversight. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, 
however, continuing scrutiny by the Houses of the Oireachtas has not been 
particularly effective. Additional debate and scrutiny on several of these points 
took place in the Special Committee on COVID-19 Response and were highlighted 
166  IHREC, ‘Statement from the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission on COVID-19 Oversight in 
Respect of Human Rights and Equality’ (27 April 2020).
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in its report.167 However, there is little sign as yet that this report is informing the 
Government’s approach.
This highlights clearly the potential risk of broad delegations of law-making power 
in this context. There are three ways of mitigating this risk. We have already 
seen in chapter 2 that the sunset clauses have not meaningfully constrained the 
Government’s ability to secure lengthy extensions to its own powers. In the next two 
chapters, we evaluate the success of two further mitigation mechanisms: Oireachtas 
oversight of the secondary legislation; consideration of human rights and equality 
concerns during the secondary law-making process itself.
167  Special Committee on Covid-19 Response, ‘Final Report’, (Houses of the Oireachtas, October 2020).
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Chapter 5
Oireachtas Oversight 
of Law-Making by the 
Minister for Health
Introduction
In order to ensure that human rights and equality concerns are addressed, it is 
essential that there be Oireachtas oversight of the secondary law-making process. 
This provides crucial public oversight and accountability for the rules made, and it can 
help inform public understanding and debate around the propriety of the use of these 
powers. This is not only desirable, but also demanded by the principle of legality under 
international human rights law. Even in situations of national emergency, the ECHR 
requires that measures be effected ‘in accordance with a procedure prescribed by 
law’.168 The Venice Commission has repeatedly emphasised the need for parliamentary 
oversight of declarations and prolongations of states of emergency.169 The Council 
of Europe has reaffirmed that parliaments must ‘keep the power to control executive 
action’ even if this means ‘intervening on an ad hoc basis to modify or annul the 
decisions of the executive’.170 In addition, General Comment No. 29, elaborating on 
the requirements of Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
provides that ‘[s]afeguards related to derogation, as embodied in article 4 of the 
Covenant, are based on the principles of legality and the rule of law inherent in the 
Covenant as a whole’.171 Article 4 further requires that, during public emergencies, 
state organs ‘shall be subject to controls in the exercise of their power through the 
parliament, courts, or other competent independent bodies’.172
Legal constraints on the Minister’s 
use of delegated legislation
The Minister is not entirely at large as to what regulations he can make, but is 
guided and limited by the principles and policies contained in the Act itself. That 
said, the powers delegated by the Health Preservation Act are sweeping in respect 
of the conduct that may be prohibited by the Minister by regulation, and the effect 
on rights is potentially vast. As White points out, the powers were ultimately 
used to mandate face coverings be worn on public transport, something never 
discussed during the passage of the legislation.173 In our view, the face covering 
regulations do fall within the broad legislative power delegated to the Minister. 
168  Alparslan Altan v Turkey App no 12778/17 (ECtHR, 16 April 2019) paras 117-119; Mehmet Hasan Altan v 
Turkey App no 13237/17 (ECtHR, 20 March 2018) paras 140 and 213.
169  Venice Commission: European Commission for Democracy through Law, Compilation of Venice 
Commission Opinions and Reports on States of Emergency (CDL-PI(2020)003, 16 April 2020) 14 https://www.
venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-PI(2020)003-e accessed 19 November 2020.
170  Council of Europe, Respecting Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights in the Framework of the 
COVID-19 Sanitary Crisis (SG/Info(2020)11, 7 April 2020) 4.
171  United Nations, General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (2001) UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add.11 31, para 16.
172  United Nations Economic and Social Council, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation 
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1984/4, 28 September 
1984) para 24.
173  Conor White, ‘The Oireachtas and Mandatory Face Coverings’ COVID-19 Law and Human Rights 
Observatory (13 July 2020).
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Nevertheless, the fact that such a pervasive, if not particularly intrusive, restriction 
on personal liberty as the requirement to cover one’s face could be introduced 
by the Minister despite never having been considered by the members of the 
Oireachtas illustrates the importance of ongoing Oireachtas oversight.
Oireachtas oversight
Unfortunately, parliamentary oversight of the rulemaking process and its outputs in 
Ireland has been lacking in several respects. There was general difficulty in convening 
the Houses of Oireachtas, due to (potentially incorrect) legal advice that suggested 
that the Houses could not hold remote sittings due to constitutional impediments. 
This meant that no ordinary committees sat between January and October of 2020, 
when some of the most important legislative and regulatory decisions were made. 
A Special Committee on COVID-19 Response sat on 29 days between 6 May 2020 
and 30 September 2020. The Committee investigated many matters and published a 
comprehensive report on these matters on 6 October 2020, making some important 
recommendations.174 Nevertheless, its brief was too wide to realistically be able to 
devote significant attention to all relevant measures. Moreover, having to look at so 
many sectoral concerns, its ability to examine the legislative and regulatory measures 
in detail was very limited.
Most importantly, the Health Act 1947 provides only limited scope for Oireachtas 
oversight of secondary legislation made by the Minister for Health. There is no scope 
for pre-enactment consultation with or scrutiny by any committee of the Houses for 
regulations introduced. This is unsurprising, as these regulations have been drawn 
up in very short timeframes to respond to rapidly changing circumstances. However, 
the scope for ex-post scrutiny—which is more realistic to carry out—is limited. 
Section 5 of the Health Act 1947 requires regulations to be laid before each House 
of the Oireachtas as soon as may be after being made. Either House may annul the 
Regulation by resolution within the next 21 days.175
Such powers of annulment are almost never used. To take an example, the week of 11 
May 2020 saw SI 174/2020,176 one of the most significant sets of regulations made by 
174  Special Committee on Covid-19 Response, ‘Final Report’, (Houses of the Oireachtas, October 2020).
175  Health Act 1947, s 5.
176  Health Act 1947 (Section 31A – Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 
2020, SI 174/2020.
ʥUnfortunately, parliamentary oversight of the 
rulemaking process and its outputs in Ireland 
has been lacking in several respects.
the Minister for Health, laid before the Dáil. That week, an additional 26 documents 
were laid before the House, including 13 other sets of annullable regulations.177 None 
of these was even debated. On one occasion, a deputy unsuccessfully moved to annul 
a set of COVID-19 regulations. Though the proposer of the motion focused more on 
economic grounds for opposition, several deputies who voted against the regulations 
did cite civil liberties concerns over penal measures in a detailed debate.178
Conclusion  
Greater political scrutiny of pandemic measures that raise human rights and 
equality concerns is desirable. It has been called for in several Dáil debates.179 
The Special Committee on COVID-19 Response in its report made several 
recommendations that all legislation and regulations made pursuant to the 
pandemic should be scrutinised ex post by the sectoral Committees of the 
House.180 While this recommendation has merit, we suggest a different approach 
in respect of restrictions introduced by the Minister for Health under the Health 
Preservation Act. In chapter 4, building on earlier work of IHREC, we recommended 
the establishment of a Joint Oireachtas Committee on Equality, Human Rights and 
Diversity. As well as reviewing Bills, this Committee should scrutinise ex post the 
regulations made by the Minister for Health. It would swiftly issue a report on the 
impact of each new set of regulations.
New Zealand offers a compelling model, where relevant regulations are 
disallowable: that is, they cease to have effect unless they are positively affirmed 
by the legislature within 10 sitting days of their passage.181 This would actively 
direct the attention of each House of the Oireachtas to the contents of the 
regulations, and compel the Government to defend their necessity and propriety. 
This in turn might inform public debate in general about the regulations. Given that 
more regular sittings of the Houses is now possible, it should be possible to give 
effect to such a mechanism. This would also conform with the recommendation of 
the Venice Commission:
A solution which combines respect for the supremacy of the legislature with 
the need for speed and decisive action is to provide that all government 
ordinances issued under delegated powers are speedily (or within a specified 
period of days) put before the legislature either for approval, or to give it 
177  Houses of the Oireachtas, Documents Laid List (Week beginning 11 May 2020).
178  Dáil Deb 9 Sep 2020, vol 997, no 1. The motion was moved by Mattie McGrath TD, whose focus in 
putting forward the motion was the economic effect of the Health Act 1947 (Section 31A - Temporary 
Restrictions) (Covid-19) (No. 4) Regulations 2020, SI 326/2020.
179  During debate on the recent Health (Amendment) Bill 2020, this point was made by representatives of 
Sinn Féin, Labour, and the Social Democrats.
180  Houses of the Oireachtas, Special Committee on COVID-19 Response: Final Report (6 October 2020) para 
172.
181  COVID-19 Public Health Response Act 2020 (NZ), s 17; Legislation Act 2012 (NZ), s 37 et seq.
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an opportunity to disapprove these. Such a parliamentary power must be 
framed to allow it not to approve, or disapprove of, specific provisions of 
an ordinance, rather than an ‘all or nothing’ approach to the ordinance as a 
whole. This in turn means that the parliament must obviously continue to 
sit: dissolution of the parliament should not be possible during the state of 
emergency.182
182  Council of Europe: European Commission for Democracy through Law, Respect for Democracy, Human 
Rights and the Rule of Law during States of Emergency – Reflections (CDL-PI(2020)005rev, 26 May 2020) paras 
70-71.
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Chapter 6
The Consideration 





The most significant rights restrictions have been implemented through delegated 
legislation made by the Minister for Health. In approving the Health Preservation 
Act, members of the Oireachtas were only aware of the powers granted to the 
Minister for Health, not precisely how those powers would be exercised. The 
sunset provision in the Health Amendment Act itself did not lead to any significant 
scrutiny prior to its extension to 9 June 2021. The capacity for the Oireachtas to 
annul regulations has never come close to being exercised. It is therefore critical 
that the process through which the Minister for Health makes regulations involves 
consideration of human rights and equality concerns. In this chapter, we explore 
the process through which secondary legislation is made. We first identify the 
parameters that apply, both from the primary statute and from general practice. 
We then identify the very specific role of NPHET and how this has evolved over 
time. Finally, we explore how human rights and equality considerations may feature 
in this process.
The making of secondary regulations
As we saw in chapter 2, when making regulations, the Minister is required to 
consider the general public health situation, the need to act expeditiously, the 
resources of the health system, the financial resources of the State, and the advice 
of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) of the Department of Health. The Minister 
may have regard to any relevant guidance issued by bodies such as the WHO and 
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. The Minister must also 
consult other Ministers of the Government who hold relevant functions, and may 
consult any other person he considers appropriate.
Although the Minister has the sole legal power to make the regulations, under 
the Constitution, the Cabinet is collectively responsible for the Departments 
of State, administered by members of the Government. It is unsurprising that 
the policy decisions ultimately reflected in the regulations have been made by 
the Cabinet as a whole, whether at virtual or in-person cabinet meetings, rather 
than by the Minister for Health in isolation. The Government’s role is probably to 
approve the broad policy direction later reflected in regulations, as well as any 
particularly contentious matters. We can infer from many public statements on the 
matter that Government adopts a holistic view of the need for these measures, 
including various public health factors, economic consequences, consequences 
for individuals and groups, which would include various rights considerations and 
concerns about the vulnerable. As with consideration by the Oireachtas, however, 
there is little or no evidence to suggest that the Government engages in a formal 
human rights or equality scrutiny of the regulations.
It is likely that the Department of Health takes the lead in drafting the regulations, 
although the Office of the Attorney General may well provide both drafting and 
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advisory assistance.183 Whether located in the Office of the Attorney General or 
the Department of Health, the ability of civil servants to take into account human 
rights and equality concerns in drafting laws that meet the Government’s policy 
objectives would be affected by time pressure.
Significant new regulations are usually preceded by a Regulatory Impact Analysis 
(RIA),184 which must include consideration of the proposed impact of the 
regulation on ‘the rights of the citizen/human rights’.185 Officials should consider 
this and conduct a ‘high level of analysis’ where significant rights impacts are 
identified.186 Consideration should be given to ‘the personal rights defined in 
the Irish Constitution as well as to international agreements to which Ireland is 
a party. These include United Nations Treaties such as the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and Council of Europe Treaties like the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.’187 A RIA would 
also examine the impact on ‘socially excluded or vulnerable groups including 
gender equality, poverty, people with disabilities and rural communities’.188 No 
RIAs in respect of any of the COVID regulations have been published. Given 
the extraordinary speed with which they have had to be drawn up, it would be 
surprising if RIAs had been prepared. As understandable as this is, it does remove a 
crucial stage from the normal legislative process.
The role of NPHET
As noted above, the Minister for Health must consider the advice of the CMO 
when making the regulations. This rightly puts public health to the forefront of 
legislation, helping to vindicate positive rights to life, health, and bodily integrity. 
The CMO leads NPHET for COVID-19, set up on 27 January 2020. It is composed 
of members of various state bodies, including the Department of Health, HSE, 
Health Protection Surveillance Centre (HPSC), Health Information and Quality 
Authority (HIQA), Health Products Regulatory Authority (HPRA) and others with 
‘relevant experience in health and/or other matters’. Importantly, all of these are 
public bodies within the meaning of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission 
Act 2014. They are therefore subject to the obligation in section 42 to have regard 
to the need to eliminate discrimination in the performance of their functions.
The composition of NPHET has been criticised for not including various viewpoints 
183  Although Parliamentary counsel in the Attorney General’s Office draft all Bills, their role in relation to 
statutory instruments may be limited to settling them. See http://www.attorneygeneral.ie/pc/pc_do.html 
visited 29 November 2020.
184  Department of the Taoiseach, Cabinet Handbook (December 2006) Appendix 3. Typically this involves a 
screening RIA and a full RIA if significant costs or impacts are identified.
185  Department of the Taoiseach, Cabinet Handbook (December 2006) 62-64.
186  Department of the Taoiseach, Revised RIA Guidelines (June 2009) para 4.57.
187  Department of the Taoiseach, Revised RIA Guidelines (June 2009) para 4.58.
188  Department of the Taoiseach, Cabinet Handbook (December 2006) 62.
from key stakeholders, such as children with autism and their parents and nursing 
home operators.189 In response, the Government has said that NPHET is not 
supposed to be a representative body.190 Some have queried whether NPHET 
includes a sufficient diversity of medical and scientific opinion.191
Among NPHET’s terms of reference are the responsibility to ‘oversee and provide 
direction, guidance, support and expert advice across the health service and the 
wider public service, for the overall national response to Coronavirus, including 
national and regional and other outbreak control arrangements.’192 In addition 
to the core NPHET, there was an Expert Advisory Group and various subgroups, 
including an Acute Hospital Preparedness Subgroup, a Behavioural Change 
Subgroup, an Irish Epidemiological Modelling Advisory Group, and a Vulnerable 
People Subgroup. In November 2020, it was reported that almost all of the NPHET 
subgroups, including its Expert Advisory Group, had been wound down over the 
summer and their functions incorporated into the Department of Health. The 
Modelling Advisory group is the only one that remains.193 The winding down of 
these sub-groups has deprived NPHET of access to wider expertise that might 
be relevant to human rights and equality concerns. We are not aware of any public 
statement of the rationale for these changes.
NPHET makes its decisions and recommendations by consensus and on a 
collective basis.194 It communicates its recommendations to the Minister for Health 
directly after its meetings.195 NPHET states that it is committed to transparency, 
and will communicate its decisions publicly and provide media briefings. However, 
particularly early in the pandemic, there were extensive delays in the publication of 
minutes.196 In mid-September, the Government announced the creation of a new 
oversight group to act as a filter for the recommendations of NPHET.197 Chaired by 
the Secretary General to the Government, it would meet weekly, usually following 
the issuance of advice by NPHET.
189  Catherine Connolly, Dáil Deb 6 May 2020, vol 992, no 9; 21 May 2020, vol 993, no 4; 10 June 2020, vol 
993, no 9; 8 July 2020, vol 994, no 6.
190  Leo Varadkar, Dáil Deb 7 May 2020, vol 992, no 10.
191  Diarmaid Ferriter, ‘We must consider NPHET may be wrong’ The Irish Times (11 September 2020).
192  Department of Health, ‘National Public Health Emergency Team (NPHET) for COVID-19: Terms of 
Reference’ (11 February 2020) https://www.gov.ie/en/collection/691330-national-public-health-emergency-
team-covid-19-coronavirus/ accessed 19 November 2020.
193  Paul Cullen, ‘Covid advisory groups shut as work “realigned” into departments’ The Irish Times (4 
November 2020).
194  Department of Health, ‘National Public Health Emergency Team (NPHET) for COVID-19: Governance 
Structures’ (26 June 2020) 5 https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/de1c30-national-public-health-emergency-
team-nphet-for-covid-19-governance-/ accessed 19 November 2020.
195  ibid 5.
196  ‘Holohan says delay in publishing NPHET meeting minutes is due to “workload issue”’, Journal.ie (27 April 
2020).
197  Harry McGee, ‘New Covid-19 oversight group to filter advice from NPHET to Cabinet’ The Irish Times (15 
September 2020).
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The relationship between NPHET 
and the Government
The accountability trap
The interaction of Cabinet decision-making and NPHET’s expert advice has the 
potential to create an accountability trap, particularly important for human rights 
and equality considerations. The members of NPHET have expertise in health 
matters, but little expertise in other areas, including but not limited to human 
rights and equality (particularly following the dissolution of the sub-groups). There 
is a risk that expert advice, limited to public health, captures the whole decision-
making process, such that the advice becomes the decision. This may happen due 
to the force of the advice, the publicity associated with it, or a desire on the part of 
elected politicians to avoid accountability for decisions. This would be problematic 
both because important decisions should be made by democratically accountable 
actors and because NPHET has no particular expertise in human rights and 
equality.
The relationship between Government and NPHET is challenging to map, making 
it difficult to ascertain if the accountability trap has arisen.198 Although the formal 
relationship is one in which NPHET advises the Government, NPHET’s advice has 
at times appeared to carry determinative or close to determinative weight. In 
this section of the Report, we examine the public record, including media reports, 
to attempt to identify the precise role played by NPHET. We do so, not out of 
idle speculation, but rather because this is the only way in which to ascertain the 
consideration being given to human rights and equality considerations in the 
secondary law-making process. The available evidence suggests that NPHET has 
played three different roles at different times or in respect of different issues: de 
facto decisionmaker, collaborator, advisor.
NPHET as de facto decisionmaker
The Government has frequently stressed its reliance on expert advice from 
NPHET, particularly in the early days of the pandemic. This has, on occasion, veered 
towards the Government suggesting that the advice is determinative, or that there 
was little scope to depart from the advice or act in the absence of advice. There 
are several examples ranging from testing priorities,199 to face coverings,200 to 
198  Concerns about the unclear nature of the relationship have been raised in the Dáil on several occasions. 
See Alan Kelly and Seán Sherlock, Dáil Deb 23 April 2020, vol 992, no 7; Ossian Smyth, Dáil Deb 30 April 2020, 
vol 992, no 8.
199  See the comments of Simon Harris in the Dáil that testing priorities would be ‘decided by public health 
experts and NPHET’ and that these would ‘not be political decisions’. Dáil Deb 7 May 2020, vol 992, no 10.
200  See the comment of Leo Varadkar that ‘we have to be guided by the CMO and NPHET on something 
that is purely a matter of public health advice.’ Dáil Deb 21 May 2020, vol 993, no 4. Similarly, Shane Ross 
additional restrictions in nursing homes.201 Some opposition deputies accused the 
Government of letting ‘the tail wag the dog’202 in being so deferential to NPHET.
NPHET as collaborator
There have been several instances where NPHET and the Government appear to 
have disagreed but reached a form of amiable consensus by means of persuasion 
or discussion. For example, in April, the Government reportedly wished to allow 
child minders to go to the homes of healthcare workers, but was not implementing 
this because of NPHET’s unhappiness with the proposal.203 On the other hand, as 
restrictions were being eased in June, Cabinet decided—with NPHET apparently 
endorsing or at least acquiescing in the decision—that the movement restrictions 
should be loosened to allow a 20 kilometre radius, and that shopping centres 
should be allowed to reopen, both of these being more significant relaxations than 
NPHET had recommended.204 These examples suggested a process of negotiation 
as to what the advice should be, producing advice which the Government would 
then be able to follow. This undermines accountability because it becomes unclear 
who is formulating the expert advice and who is deciding whether to accept that 
advice.
NPHET as advisor
There are several instances where the Government has not adopted 
NPHET’s advice. The biggest disagreement, of course, concerned NPHET’s 
recommendation for a second lockdown in October 2020. On 4 October, NPHET 
recommended to the Government that the country be placed on Level 5 lockdown 
for four weeks.205 This advice was said to have taken the Government by surprise. 
The Government very publicly and directly declined to follow this advice, and 
instead moved the country to Level 3. When explaining this decision, Minister 
for Health Stephen Donnelly pointed out that NPHET had written a letter on the 
Thursday, three days before their Level 5 recommendation, advising that a move 
to Level 3 was necessary. The Minister said that the Government did not believe 
the data had changed sufficiently in those three days to warrant Level 5. The 
claimed he could not make masks mandatory on public transport in the absence of NPHET advice. Dáil Deb 3 
June 2020, vol 993, no 7.
201  Dáil Deb 16 April 2020, vol 992, no 6.
202  Jack Quann, ‘Alan Kelly: “The tail is wagging the dog” when it comes to NPHET and the Government’ 
Newstalk (4 June 2020).
203  Michelle Hennessy, ‘Who’s calling the shots? - The role of Ireland’s public health emergency team and its 
key players’ The Journal (25 April 2020).
204  Fiach Kelly, ‘Ministers happy to be part of plan to lift restrictions’ The Irish Times (6 June 2020). The 
Government said that they were able to get around the need to close shopping centres, for example, by 
implementing better guidelines on social distancing.
205  ‘Letter from CMO to Minister for Health re COVID-19 (Coronavirus)’ (4 October 2020).
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Minister stressed that it was NPHET’s role to advise the Government on ‘what they 
believe is required from a public health perspective to suppress this virus’, but the 
Government ‘has a different job’.206
The high profile and very public nature of this disagreement highlighted that 
the Government always retained the formal power to reject NPHET’s advice. 
Nevertheless, political factors may lead a reversion to a collaborator or decision-
maker role for NPHET. Less than two weeks later, indeed, in the context of a 
further increase in cases, NPHET again recommended a Level 5 lockdown to the 
Government on 15 October 2020, this time for six weeks rather than four.207 On 
19 October 2020, the Government decided to follow this recommendation.208 
Later again, however, in its decision to ease the lockdown on 1 December,209 the 
Government went further than recommended by NPHET in relation to easing 
restrictions on hospitality, in particular at the same time as easing the rules on 
household visiting.210
The consideration of human rights and equality 
concerns by NPHET and Government
This shifting relationship between NPHET and the Government makes it difficult to 
ascertain where, if at all, human rights and equality concerns are addressed. It does 
appear that NPHET, notwithstanding its lack of expertise, considers human rights 
and equality concerns. In a document, prepared by one of the dissolved subgroups, 
entitled ‘Ethical framework for decision-making in a pandemic’, NPHET outlines 
seven ‘key ethical principles that should inform the pandemic planning process and 
decision-making during a pandemic’:




 • duty to provide care;
206  Órla Ryan, ‘Tánaiste stands over NPHET criticisms while Taoiseach’s spokesperson says Varadkar is 
“entitled to his opinion”’ The Journal (6 October 2020).
207  ‘Letter from CMO to Minister for Health re COVID-19 (Coronavirus)’ (15 October 2020).
208  ‘Ireland placed on Level 5 of the Plan for Living with COVID-19’ (Government Press Release, 19 October 
2020).
209  ‘Ireland placed on Level 3 of the Plan for Living with COVID-19 - with special measures for a safe 
Christmas’ (Government Press Release, 27 November 2020).
210  ‘Letter from CMO to Minister for Health re COVID-19 (Coronavirus)’ (26 October 2020).
 • reciprocity; and
 • privacy. 211
NPHET acknowledges that ‘Many of the issues encountered in planning and 
responding to a pandemic involve balancing rights, interests and values.’212 It is 
also aware that there is an acute need to accord to these principles in any ‘decision 
taken to restrict the liberty of individuals’:
Decisions to limit individual liberty should be introduced only if the best 
available scientific evidence indicates that the measure(s) considered will 
achieve the intended goal; that the limitation(s) planned is proportionate to 
the anticipated benefit; that no less restrictive measure would be effective; 
and that failure to implement the measure would result in significant harm. 
Restrictions should apply without unfair discrimination, and the need for 
measures which limit individual liberty should be continually reviewed and 
assessed in light of emerging evidence.213
In another document entitled ‘Public Health Framework Approach in providing 
advice to Government’, NPHET outlines several factors it would regard in offering 
advice to the Government.214 Noting the ‘indirect effects’ of its recommendations 
being adopted on the economic, societal and other health factors, it advocates a 
‘proportionate and practical’ approach which balances overall risk with ‘a hierarchy 
of benefits in terms of population health and wellbeing understanding, feasibility, 
acceptance and adherence to support ongoing restrictions, economic and social 
factors, human rights, ethical principles and other considerations’.215
211  Department of Health, ‘Ethical framework for decision-making in a pandemic’ (24 September 2020) 
5-7 https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/dbf3fb-ethical-framework-for-decision-making-in-a-pandemic/ 
accessed 19 November 2020. It also has a set of 5 procedural values that it seeks to abide by in its processes; 
see Department of Health, ‘Procedural Values for Decision-making in a Pandemic’ https://assets.gov.ie/79563/
edee4d9e-b48b-4fb4-bff5-10db991107bd.pdf accessed 19 November 2020.
212  ibid 3.
213  ibid 13. At the same page, it is further noted that ‘the potential tension between individual rights and 
the collective good, and require consideration of how justifiable it is to restrict individual rights and freedoms in 
order to achieve certain public health goals.’
214  NPHET, ‘Public Health Framework Approach in providing advice to Government in relation to reducing 
social distancing measures introduced in response to COVID-19’ (1 May 2020) https://assets.gov.ie/73787/c90
4068ef79e4595b85b9e4d3321d013.pdf accessed 19 November 2020.
215  ibid 7.
 ʥ  This shifting relationship between NPHET and the 
Government makes it difficult to ascertain where, if at 
all, human rights and equality concerns are addressed.
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From these documents, we can see that, though not engaging in detailed or expert 
rights analysis, NPHET is committed in its process to have regard to concerns 
other than public health calculation, including concerns about rights and personal 
liberties. It also places at the centre of its articulated decision-making process 
a procedure that bears a close resemblance to the proportionality balancing 
analysis that we see in constitutional and human rights analysis. It remains the 
case, however, that NPHET has no expertise in carrying out such assessments. 
Moreover, as noted by IHREC in May 2020, the guidance did not specifically 
consider relevant domestic or international equality and human rights law and 
standards, and there is no discussion of the legal and human rights requirements 
which clinicians need to follow in making decisions about patients. Further, there 
appeared to have been limited or no consultation with those groups most likely to 
be affected.216
In addition, it is concerning that NPHET does not routinely engage with the 
recommendations of the World Health Organisation, a specialised agency of the 
United Nations responsible for public health.
NPHET’s consideration of human rights and equality concerns can provide an 
important preliminary check in the formulation of public health advice, establishing 
a tolerable baseline of rights protection below which the ultimate legislation should 
not fall, but it does not displace the Government’s responsibility. Given the unclear 
and shifting relationship between NPHET and Government, however, and the need 
for Government to make decisions quickly in response to NPHET advice, there 
is a risk that this will become the sole point at which human rights and equality 
concerns are considered. This would be deeply problematic, particularly given the 
lack of relevant expertise in NPHET and the failure to formulate the human rights 
and equality standards with reference to national and international law.
Conclusion  
Restrictions on everyday life are critical to the State’s response to COVID-19. 
These are, in principle, a legitimate exercise of state power designed to secure 
public health and indeed to vindicate positive rights to life, health, and bodily 
integrity. But draconian restrictions can interfere with human rights and affect 
the most vulnerable groups in society. It is therefore important that human rights 
and equality concerns be carefully addressed as such regulations are drafted and 
adopted. The extent to and manner in which this occurs at present is, however, far 
from clear. The policy impetus for new restrictions comes from NPHET. NPHET 
itself gives some consideration to the sort of concerns that are reflected in human 
rights and equality guarantees, but has neither legal expertise in these matters 
nor direct insight into the experiences of those who would be affected. While the 
216  IHREC, ‘Letter to the Minister for Health’ (18 May 2020).
Government is not bound to follow NPHET’s advice, shifting political dynamics 
may leave the Government with little alternative. Also, there is frequently very 
little time between NPHET’s recommendation and new regulations being adopted. 
This suggests that by the time NPHET makes its recommendation, it is often too 
late for any meaningful consideration to be given to human rights and equality 
concerns.
There are two critical points at which human rights and equality considerations 
need to be addressed: (a) in the formulation of NPHET’s advice; and (b) in the 
formulation of policy proposals for Government in response to NPHET’s advice. 
We therefore recommend the re-establishment of a NPHET sub-group with 
the relevant expertise to address ethical, human rights, and equality concerns. 
In addition, to avoid relegation of these concerns to peripheral groups, NPHET 
itself should have members with expertise on ethical, human rights, and equality 
concerns. We also recommend that the Government oversight committee that 
filters NPHET recommendations should have representation from the Department 
of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth. Finally, we recommend that 
the Minister for Health should publish a human rights and equality analysis of the 
proportionality of each set of regulations within 48 hours of their being made. 
This would inform the work of the Joint Oireachtas Committee recommended in 
previous chapters.
Synthesising the analysis of the last three chapters, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that the delegation of legislative power to the Minister for Health 
has resulted in a black hole for the consideration of human rights and equality 
concerns. Members of the Oireachtas could not meaningfully raise such concerns 
because it was unclear precisely what restrictions would be introduced. The 
sunset provisions and procedures allowing the Oireachtas to annul measures have 
had little, if any, purchase. The interaction between NPHET and the Government 
in approving the policy direction and preparing legislation may allow for some 
consideration of human rights and equality concerns. However, this is largely 
done by those with neither expertise, nor insight into the needs of disadvantaged 
groups, nor democratic accountability. Such consideration, if it occurs, is not 
available for public scrutiny. This is a significant defect in Ireland’s COVID-19 
response, breaching international law norms relating to the rule of law.217
217  Council of Europe, Respecting Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights in the Framework of the 
COVID-19 Sanitary Crisis (SG/Info(2020)11, 7 April 2020) 4.
 ʥ  ...it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the 
delegation of legislative power to the Minister 
for Health has resulted in a black hole for the 
consideration of human rights and equality concerns.
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Chapter 7
Rule of Law Concerns 
in Making the 
Regulations
Introduction
In this chapter, we outline rule of law concerns that have arisen in relation to the 
way in which regulations are presented. Laws should be published in advance, be 
clear, and be non-contradictory. These requirements protect all who are subject 
to the law but are particularly important to those from disadvantaged groups that 
may have a problematic relationship with law enforcement authorities. These 
groups have most to fear from legally uncontrolled enforcement powers. We 
return to that concern in chapter 9. There are three rule of law concerns related 
to the presentation of regulations. First, they have frequently not been published 
before they have come into force. Second, official Government statements have 
provided misleading accounts of what the law requires. Third, official Government 
statements have tended to blur the distinction between the regulations and public 
health advice, making the content of the law very unclear in people’s minds.218
Promulgation
Regulations have routinely entered into force before they were published. Typically, 
several days elapse between the Minister for Health making new regulations 
and their being notified in Iris Oifigiúil and published on the Irish Statute Book. 
The Statutory Instruments Act 1947 ensures that people cannot be criminally 
prosecuted for breaching the provisions during this period.219 But where criminal 
prohibitions are being loosened rather than tightened—as was the case from 
Stage A to Stages B and C—people may wrongly think that certain behaviour is still 
prohibited.
The regulations that moved the State into Stage F came into force on Thursday 22 
October.220 The Minister for Health is reported to have signed the regulations into 
law at 11.50pm that night.221 Notice of making the regulations was published in Iris 
Oifigiúil on Friday 23 October. There is no obvious reason why the Minister could 
not have made the regulations come into force 10 minutes after he signed them, 
rather than 23 hours and 50 minutes before he signed them. His failure to do so 
suggests a lack of concern for the rule of law. It is both retroactive legislation, since 
the regulations applied to events that occurred earlier in the day before the law 
was made, and a failure of notice.
While contemporaneous publication would be helpful, the Department of Health 
should go further. In New Zealand, the COVID-19 regulations must—absent some 
218  In chapter 8, we consider a separate rule of law concern that the ‘reasonable excuse’ exception to many 
of the restrictions on people’s liberty renders the laws unacceptably vague.
219  Section 3.
220  Health Act 1947 (Section 31A - Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) (No. 8) Regulations 2020, SI 
448/2020.
221  See Seanad Debate 23 October 2020, contribution of Senator Ivana Bacik.
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urgent public health need—be published 48 hours before they take effect.222 This 
allows people and businesses take steps to ensure that they will comply with the 
law. This should be possible in most circumstances.
Misleading descriptions of the law
Regulations can be difficult to understand. The Department of Health website 
sometimes carries a lay person’s description of what the regulations do, but these 
can misdescribe the actual legal obligations people are under. For example, at 
the start of Stage B a new set of movement restrictions was introduced.223 The 
website stated:
We can travel within a 20 kilometre radius of our homes or anywhere within 
our county for social and recreational purposes. This includes travel and 
leisure.
We can gather for social or recreational purposes in other people’s homes, 
subject to a maximum of 6 people at such a gathering.
We can exercise outdoors with others or gather outdoors with others for 
social and recreational purposes, subject to a maximum of 15 people.
People may travel outside of these geographical limits for visits to vulnerable 
persons.224
A casual reader might have gleaned from this guide that the key movement 
restriction in the regulations is the distance limit: you may travel 20km or 
within your own county if it is for social or recreational purposes, but further 
travel is permitted only to visit a vulnerable person. Such a reading would have 
been incorrect, however. The 20km limit only applied to movement for social 
or recreational purposes. If you were travelling for any other purposes—work, 
shopping, politics, religion, protest, educational, cultural, etc.—no distance limits 
applied.
Law versus guidance
The pandemic response has properly relied on both law and public health guidance. 
However, there has been a strong tendency to blur the distinction between the 
two. During the most extreme phase of the lockdown, over-70s were advised to 
222  COVID-19 Public Health Response Act 2020 (NZ), s 14.
223  Health Act 1947 (Section 31A - Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) (No. 2) Regulations 2020, SI 
206/2020, reg 5. See discussion in chapter 3.
224  Department of Health, ‘Statutory Instruments related to the COVID-19 pandemic’.
self-isolate but there was never any legal requirement to this effect. But official 
guidance used language to suggest that cocooning was mandatory: ‘you need to 
cocoon’,225 ‘you cannot have visitors to your home’.226
The only legal obligations on international passengers have been to provide, 
confirm, and update information about where they will be or are residing.227 There 
has never been any legal obligation to restrict movements. The Government’s 
own website correctly reflected this, stating that passengers were ‘asked to 
restrict their movements for 14 days’.228 The Department of Foreign Affairs 
website, however, stated ‘the Irish authorities require anyone coming into Ireland 
… to restrict their movement for 14 days.’229 In Ryanair v An Taoiseach, the High 
Court rejected a challenge by Ryanair to the Government’s travel advice, partly on 
the basis that the DFA website, which after Ryanair instituted proceedings was 
changed from that just quoted, clearly presented the Government position as non-
mandatory.
In chapter 3, we drew attention to the confusion over whether religious services 
were prohibited, particularly during Stage F. On the one hand, the Department 
of Health in its official statements insisted (correctly) that there was no legal 
prohibition on holding religious services. On the other hand, the Gardaí threatened 
clerics with prosecution for holding religious services.
Across these three areas—‘cocooning’, international travel, and religious 
services—we see a common trend. When challenged, whether through the 
Oireachtas or in the courts, the Government falls back on the correct legal position 
that there is no prohibition. Away from challenges by the politically powerful or 
well resourced, the Government is quite prepared to allow ordinary people believe 
they are subject to much greater restrictions than is in fact the case. Clearly the 
Government is not responsible for prosecution decisions made by individual 
Gardaí, but it is responsible for creating such confusion that Gardaí could believe 
that religious services were criminally prohibited one week after the Government 
had issued a statement to clarify that this was not the case. The more charitable 
interpretation is that the Government has been wilfully indifferent to whether 
it is possible for citizens and law enforcement authorities to understand their 
legal obligations. The less charitable interpretation is that the Government 
has deliberately encouraged citizens to misunderstand the extent of their legal 
obligations in order to allow the Government to achieve policy goals that might 
225  HSE, ‘Cocooning’ (18 May 2020). This was removed from the HSE website but the Observatory retains a 
PDF of the webpage as of 2 June 2000.
226  HSE, ‘COVID-19 Cocooning Public Health Advice’ https://www.hse.ie/eng/services/news/newsfeatures/
covid19-updates/partner-resources/a-guide-to-cocooning-easy-read-.pdf accessed 18 November 2020.
227  See discussion in chapter 3.
228  Department of the Taoiseach, ‘COVID-19 Passenger Locator Form’ (31 August 2020) https://www.gov.
ie/en/publication/ab900-covid-19-passenger-locator-form/ accessed 18 November 2020.
229  The Department of Foreign Affairs later removed this from its website, but the Observatory retains a 
screenshot of the webpage from 27 July 2020.
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not achieve political support in the Oireachtas or that could be vulnerable to legal 
challenge.
Either way, the outcome is unacceptable from the perspective in the rule of law. 
In the Ryanair case, Simons J succinctly characterised the problem:
It would seem to be a logical extension of this case law to say that 
the courts should also intervene where a government has, by way of 
unequivocal statements, created the false impression that there is 
legislation in force which regulates certain activities when, in truth, there 
is no such legislation. Were this to happen, then the executive branch 
would be able to achieve a result which is similar in effect to legislation, 
i.e. members of the public might well be coerced into complying with the
government’s guidance in the mistaken belief that it is legally enforceable.
This is especially so in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. The
very fact that the government’s guidance-to use a neutral term-on the
measures to be taken to restrict the spread of coronavirus is, of necessity,
constantly changing means that members of the public will rely heavily
on official sources, such as government websites, to obtain information
on what are the current requirements. It is unrealistic to expect that a
member of the public will wade through reams of statutory instruments in
order to determine what the precise legal requirements are at any given
moment.230
International human rights dimensions
The rule of law concerns expressed above are contrary, both to domestic legal 
principles, as well as foundational principles of international human rights law. 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has noted that while the 
situation may require extraordinary measures, ‘[e]ven in a public emergency, these 
steps need to be based on the rule of law’.231 Rights limitations must adhere to 
principle of legality: that is, the restriction must be ‘provided by law’, which means 
that ‘the limitation must be contained in a national law of general application, 
which is in force at the time the limitation is applied. The law must not be arbitrary 
230  [2020] IESC 461 [38].
231  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Emergency Measures and COVID-19: Guidance (27 
April 2020) 1.
ʥThe Government has allowed—and most probably 
encouraged—people to believe that they are subject to 
much broader legal restrictions than is in fact the case. 
This is problematic from a human rights perspective.
or unreasonable, and it must be clear and accessible to the public’.232 Article 15(1) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that ‘[n]
o one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission
which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at
the time when it was committed’.
It is not, in our view, an adequate response to these concerns to maintain that the 
public health guidance has no legal effect. The Government has allowed—and 
most probably encouraged—people to believe that they are subject to much 
broader legal restrictions than is in fact the case. This is problematic from a human 
rights perspective. We shall return to these concerns in the enforcement context 
in chapter 9.
Conclusion  
The Government’s making and presentation of regulations raises serious rule of 
law concerns. Regulations have applied retroactively, are frequently not 
published for several days after they are made, are misleadingly described in 
official communications, and are inadequately distinguished from public health 
advice. The issues of promulgation and notice can be easily addressed. We 
recommend that regulations should be published online 48 hours before they 
come into force. The blurring of law and guidance, however, is a more deep-
seated problem. If this is a communications problem, the recommendation of 
the Joint Oireachtas Committee on the COVID Response has merit and we 
endorse it: all sectoral committees should review the communication strategy of 
their Departments to ensure that the information relating to COVID-19, and on 
COVID-19 restrictions in particular, is clear and transparent. If, however, the 
blurring of law and guidance is a deliberate strategy on the part of the 
Government, then little is served by any recommendations we can make. The 
Government should of course maintain a clear distinction between measures 
that are legally obligatory and public health advice. The Government should not 
present public health advice as if it were criminally enforceable. These are such 
basic tenets of a liberal democracy committed to the rule of law, however, that 
there should be no need to formulate 
232  ibid 1.
ʥThe blurring of law and guidance allows for the 
targeting of measures at disadvantaged and vulnerable 
groups that would not survive scrutiny if effected 
through a law. It also creates a real risk of the uneven 
application of enforcement powers by the Gardaí.
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them as recommendations. Nor are these abstract concerns. The blurring of law 
and guidance allows for the targeting of measures at disadvantaged and vulnerable 
groups that would not survive scrutiny if effected through a law. It also creates a 
real risk of the uneven application of enforcement powers by the Gardaí. We return 
to these critical concerns in chapter 9.
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Chapter 8
The Restrictions: 
Equality and Human 
Rights Analysis
Introduction
In this chapter, we consider the extent to which the State’s legal responses 
to COVID-19 infringes personal rights protected under the Constitution and 
international human rights law. We then explore a rule of law concern that arises 
from the way in which, for many offences, criminal liability does not arise if one 
has a ‘reasonable excuse’. Finally, we assess the extent to which the various 
restrictions may affect disadvantaged groups, in particular as identified by grounds 
proscribed in national and international law as well as by international treaties with 
a concern for particular groups.
Restrictions on movement
In Stages A and F, it was a criminal offence to leave one’s home without a 
reasonable excuse. There was a broad but non-exhaustive list of reasonable 
excuses, including to shop for essential items. In Stage E, it was prohibited, 
although not a criminal offence, to leave or enter a locked down county, or the 
State without a reasonable excuse. We do not consider that these restrictions 
interfere with personal liberty: there are so many permitted reasons to leave one’s 
dwelling that nobody could be said to be confined to their homes as a result of the 
regulations. In chapter 9, however, we assess the advice to older people not to leave 
their homes during Stage A.
These restrictions may, however, all be characterised as prima facie infringements 
of rights of movement and travel protected by the Constitution and international 
human rights law. Nonetheless, in our view, they meet the standards of justification 
laid down in these legal instruments. They serve the legitimate objective of 
protecting public health and are proportionate to that aim: it is clear that 
COVID-19 spreads through human contact; measures to reduce human contact 
are permissible for as long as the virus remains a serious threat. Indeed, these 
measures can be seen as a vindication of individuals’ positive rights to life, health, 
and bodily integrity.
On or before their arrival in the State, international passengers (with some 
exceptions) must complete the COVID-19 Passenger Locator Form in respect of 
themselves and any children.233 If they change their address within 14 days, they 
must inform the HSE. They must answer questions posed by immigration officers 
and HSE officials. In our view, this obligation is so minimal as not to interfere with 
any protected rights, including the right of citizens of EU to move freely within the 
EU under Art 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
233  We note possible new requirements to undertake mandatory quarantine in a hotel or the home for 
14 days after entry into the country, which would be a significant restriction on movement. At the time of 
finalising the report, no such measures had been agreed.
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Restrictions on personal liberty
As we saw in chapter 2, the Emergency Powers Act removes several of the 
procedural safeguards that apply to the involuntary detention of persons on 
mental health grounds. There is greater flexibility in the independent examination 
procedure, which need not take place in person. Also, single-member tribunals 
can make detention decisions. In our view, these measures have the potential 
to infringe the requirement for an independent hearing, identified by the High 
Court and Court of Appeal.234 The courts have stressed that the Oireachtas must 
be particularly careful in depriving those with mental illness of their liberty, and 
strong safeguards are necessary. The Emergency Powers Act includes the removal 
of several safeguards that are of concern: the possibility of patients’ detention 
being reviewed by any consultant psychiatrist rather than a designated one; the 
possibility of this examination by a consultant happening remotely, or in exigent 
circumstances, not taking place at all; the possible exclusion of the patient’s 
treating physician from this review, compensated for by a written report; and 
the ability of the Mental Health Commission to appoint a single lawyer to act as 
the tribunal for such determinations. These are extraordinary measures that, 
taken together, have the potential to significantly curtail the procedural rights 
of vulnerable patients. The existence of judicial review may not be a remedy for 
such failings.235 The constitutionality of these measures can only be determined 
in an individual case, where much would depend on precisely what had occurred. 
Nevertheless, there are serious constitutional questions about these measures.
The constitutionality of the measures may be aided by the exigent circumstances 
of the pandemic. But restrictions this significant could only be justified by a 
compelling case for necessity. Whatever about the need for flexibility of this 
sort in March 2020, the extension of these provisions until June 2021 is highly 
questionable. While the pandemic remains a serious threat, important services 
are able to function. It is settled in constitutional law that legislation, even if 
constitutional at the moment of enactment, can become unconstitutional due to 
234  RT v Director of the Central Mental Hospital [1995] 2 IR 65; AB v Clinical Director of St Loman’s Hospital 
[2018] IECA 123, [2018] 3 IR 710.
235  See AB v Clinical Director of St Loman’s Hospital [2018] IECA 123, [2018] 3 IR 710.
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a change in the underlying circumstances.236 While such changes have tended to 
occur over extended periods of time, there is no reason why this principle should 
not apply to swift changes in people’s ability to work during the pandemic, given 
the importance of the right at stake.
The position is even more stark under international human rights law. The 
permissibility of involuntary detention under the Mental Health Act 2001 is already 
in contravention of Article 14 of the CRPD. Part 5 of the Emergency Measures Act, 
extending the means by which a person with mental health difficulties may be 
detained involuntarily, and reducing the stringency of the review process, serves 
to contravene both Article 14 and the overall spirit of the CRPD to an even greater 
degree. For these reasons, we recommend that Part 5 of the Emergency Measures 
in the Public Interest (COVID-19) Act 2020 be repealed as a matter of urgency.
Restrictions on home gatherings and events
In Stage B, it was unlawful to gather in a household for recreational purposes, 
unless this was within 20km of your home or within your own county and no more 
than six people were present. In Stage D, gatherings in private homes of more 
than six people from more than three households were made unlawful, although 
not a criminal offence. In Stage E, this was tightened to no more than six people 
from one other household. And in Stage F, all household visiting was made unlawful 
unless the two households were paired. These prohibitions were not originally 
designated as criminal offences. On 22 November 2020, however, they were 
designated as criminal offences, new enforcement powers for dwelling events 
were applied, and fixed penalty notice provisions were activated.
It is arguable that these restrictions interfere with private and family life, as well 
as with the dwelling place. The restrictions significantly limit one’s freedom to 
invite other people into one’s household but do not interfere with people’s living 
arrangements: there is no control on who may form a household. For the same 
reasons as above, we consider that they meet the standards of justification laid 
down in the Constitution and international human rights law.
Mandatory face coverings
Face coverings must be worn on public transport and when in certain businesses 
and premises, unless one has a reasonable excuse. This requirement is an 
interference with personal autonomy, but a trivial one. The burden imposed 
is minimal and the public health justification is overwhelming; the specified 
‘reasonable excuses’ avoid difficulties that would attend a blanket ban. For the 
236  Blake v Attorney General [1981] IESC 1.
75 76Ireland’s Emergency Powers During the Covid-19 Pandemic Ireland’s Emergency Powers During the Covid-19 Pandemic
same reasons as above, we conclude that they meet the standards of justification 
laid down in the Constitution and international human rights law.
Rule of law concerns: the vagueness 
of ‘reasonable excuse’
The restrictions on leaving one’s home and on movement, as well as the obligation 
to wear face coverings, and the new offence in Stage F of attending a prohibited 
dwelling event do not apply where one has a reasonable excuse. While many 
reasonable excuses are specified, there remains a general category of reasonable 
excuse. If it is unclear whether you have a reasonable excuse, it is unclear whether 
you may lawfully leave your home or your county, or refuse to wear a face covering. 
In some circumstances, this leaves it uncertain whether you are committing a 
criminal offence, which in turn raises doubts about the enforcement powers held 
by Gardaí—an issue to which we return in chapter 9.
The vagueness of ‘reasonable excuse’ raises human rights concerns under both 
Irish constitutional law and international human rights law. The key concern here 
is that reading the law should enable to people know whether their future conduct 
might break the law. If the law itself is vague, they cannot anticipate whether 
they might be criminally punished. In Dokie v DPP, the High Court declared s 12 
of the Immigration Act 2004 unconstitutional by reason of vagueness.237 This 
section required a non-national to produce their identification documents on 
demand ‘unless he or she gives a satisfactory explanation of the circumstances 
which prevent him or her from so doing.’238 Kearns P commented that ‘reasonable 
excuse’ would be a preferable standard to ‘satisfactory explanation.’239 However, 
Kearns P, contrasting a similar provision in UK law, also indicated that it would be 
preferable to provide for ‘reasonable excuse’ as a defence, rather than making 
it part of the action that constitutes the offence itself.240 In short, the use of 
‘reasonable excuse’ in the restrictions on free movement is better in one respect 
than the law struck down in Dokie, but as bad as that law in another respect.
The European Court of Human Rights has made it clear that vague criminal laws are 
contrary to the principle of legality in the European Convention on Human Rights. For 
example, the case of Liivik v Estonia241 concerned Article 161 of the Estonian Criminal 
Code relating to an offence of ‘misuse of official position’. The offence had been 
inherited from the previous Soviet legal system and the national law shaping the 
offence had developed within a wholly different legal system. It was held as follows:
237  Dokie v DPP [2010] IEHC 110, [2011] 1 IR 805.
238  ibid para 20.
239  ibid para 61.
240  ibid para 59.
241  Liivik v Estonia App no 12157/05 (ECtHR, 25 June 2009).
The Court finds on the whole that the interpretation and application of Article 
161 in the present case involved the use of such broad notions and such vague 
criteria that the criminal provision in question was not of the quality required under 
the Convention in terms of its clarity and the foreseeability of its effects.242
The Human Rights Committee, interpreting Article 15 of the ICCPR,243 has similarly 
been critical of the retroactive application of the criminal law as tantamount to 
nullem crimen sine lege,244 though jurisprudence on the question of vagueness has 
not arisen frequently.
In our view, there is a real doubt as to whether the ‘reasonable excuse’ provision 
in Irish law in relation to leaving one’s home and movement generally conforms 
to the requirements of the Constitution and international human rights law. We 
recommend instead that the regulations should retain the list of enumerated 
excuses for leaving one’s dwelling, or one’s county, or the State, while separately 
providing that a person may leave their home, or county, or the State for urgent 
and compelling reasons. This would provide greater guidance by limiting the 
flexibility to truly exceptional cases and conceptually separating those cases from 
the enumerated list of everyday excuses.
The reasonable excuse provision in relation to face coverings may, in practice, be 
less problematic. The listed reasonable excuses all clearly identify circumstances 
in which it would be problematic for the individual involved to wear a face covering. 
These are different from the movement restrictions, where the reasonable 
excuses attempt to balance a range of competing factors, resulting in somewhat 
arbitrarily defined compromises (such as the 5km limit on exercise). In the case 
of face coverings, it is therefore easier to extrapolate from the list of reasonable 
excuses to other unlisted examples.
Effects on disadvantaged groups
In this section, we explore the ways in which groups identified by prohibited 
grounds of discrimination and international treaties may be disproportionately 
affected by these restrictions. It has been well documented that the pandemic 
itself has a differential impact on particular groups—especially racial and ethnic 
242  ibid para 101. Emphasis added.
243  Article 15(1) of the ICCPR provides that ‘[n]o one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account 
of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the 
time when it was committed.’
244  For example, Kivenmaa v Finland (Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 412/1990).
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minorities,245 older people,246 people with disabilities,247 women and mothers, and 
prisoners.248 IHREC has drawn attention to how inadequate conditions on Traveller 
halting sites, such as the lack of running water, makes Travellers particularly 
vulnerable to the pandemic.249 These differential impacts require focused policy 
responses that take into account human rights and equality concerns. But they are 
not the direct concern of this Report. Here we focus on disproportionate effects 
on disadvantaged groups caused by the legal measures themselves, as distinct 
from the underlying pandemic.
As we saw in chapter 1, indirect discrimination occurs where an apparently neutral 
provision would put a person at a particular disadvantage compared with other 
persons, unless the provision is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the 
means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. Given our view that 
the restrictions considered above meet the standards of justification under the 
Constitution and international human rights law, it probably also follows that 
they meet the justification component in the definition of indirect discrimination. 
Nevertheless, it is particularly important for policy-makers to be cognisant of 
measures that restrict protected rights in a way that particularly disadvantages 
vulnerable groups.
The family status, gender, and disability grounds
Making it a criminal offence to leave one’s own home without a reasonable 
excuse—and in particular the proliferation of home-working—disproportionately 
affects those with caring responsibilities in the home, with particular effects on 
mothers. The family status ground covers whether you are the parent or person 
responsible for a child under 18, or the main carer or parent of a person with 
a disability who needs ongoing care. The National Women’s Council of Ireland 
(NWCI) found that 85% of women had increased care responsibilities during 
the pandemic, showing that the gender ground is implicated here alongside the 
family status ground.250 In addition, the Economic and Social Research Institute 
(ESRI) has identified that extra care burdens impact particularly harshly on 
essential workers (i.e. those who could not work at home), 70% of whom were 
women.251 This is borne out by Central Statistics Office research that showed 
245  In the US context, see Center for Diseases Control and Prevention, ‘Health Equity Considerations 
and Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups’ (2020) available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/
community/health-equity/race-ethnicity.html (visited 27 November 2020).
246  Hernandez et al, ‘High-risk categories for COVID-19 and their distribution by county in Republic of 
Ireland-evidence from the TILDA study’ (2020).
247  https://www.inclusion-europe.eu/disability-rights-affected-coronavirus-pandemic/
248  https://www.tasc.ie/blog/2020/07/14/gender-impacts-of-covid19/
249  IHREC, Comments on Ireland’s 17th National Report on the Implementation of the European Social 
Charter, (June 2020).
250  NWCI, ‘NWCI survey findings show 85% of women have increased care responsibilities since COVID-19’ 
(23 June 2020).
251  ESRI, The Implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for policy in relation to children and young people (July 
the pandemic had a much greater negative impact on the life satisfaction of 
women than men in April 2020.252 By the same token, lone-parent families 
were disproportionately affected, in terms of caring obligations, isolation and 
loneliness.253
The listed reasonable excuses have always allowed carers to take the same steps 
in respect of vulnerable people as they could for themselves, i.e. leave the home 
to go to an essential retail outlet, etc. In particular, it is a reasonable excuse for 
leaving the home to attend to vital family matters, including to provide care 
to a vulnerable person. This would probably allow a parent to leave her or his 
home with an autistic child, subject to no distance limits—a point of concern 
that had been raised during Stage A.254 In turn, this probably ensures that the 
regulations do not disproportionately affect those with physical disabilities. 
However, for those with difficulties relating to mental health or intellectual 
capacity, the restrictions on social contact—particularly during Stages A and F—
have taken a particular toll. Children with special needs have suffered from the 
disruption to their routine.255 Adults with intellectual disabilities have been left 
without carers.256 More generally, disruption to education has been particularly 
problematic for those with mental and intellectual disabilities. It is important to 
emphasise here that, whatever about the effect of the regulations, the pandemic 
itself has had a marked disproportionate effect on both adults and children with 
disabilities.257 IHREC Commission Member Frank Conaty has drawn attention to 
the danger of the pandemic leading to an even more unfair society for people 
with disabilities.258 In this regard, we support the recommendation of IHREC 
that the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Disability Matters review the impact of 
COVID-19 and the State’s response on the rights of disabled people.259
The limitations in the definition of essential retail outlets may amount to indirect 
discrimination on the family status ground, insofar as it is families who face the 
most time-sensitive needs to buy clothes for growing children. We therefore 
recommend that the definition of essential retail outlets deployed in Stages A 
and F be extended to include providing for family essentials.
2020) 19.
252  ‘Social Impact of COVID-19 on Women and Men, April 2020’ (CSO Statistical Release, 19 May 2020).
253  NWCI et al, Supporting One Parent Families During and After the COVID-19 Crisis (Joint NGO Submission 
to the Special Committee on the COVID-19 Response, September 2020).
254  Michael McNiffe, ‘Coronavirus Ireland: Gardai say anyone caught travelling more than 2km will be told to 
go home’ Irish Mirror (8 April 2020).
255  Carol Barron, ‘How has Covid-19 affected children with special needs?’ RTÉ Brainstorm (23 June 2020).
256  Inclusion Ireland, The Experiences of Adults with Intellectual Disabilities in Ireland During the Covid-19 
Crisis (September 2020) 8.
257  We noted that these problems have been exacerbated for children with disabilities by virtue of a failure 
to reopen schools for special education in early 2021.
258  Frank Conaty, ‘No Going back to Reduced Rights for People with Disabilities’, The Irish Examiner (13 May 
2020).
259  IHREC, Consultation on Terms of Reference and Work Programme for the Joint Oireachtas Committee 
on Disability Matters Submission by the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (November 2020).
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Apart from gendered caring obligations, women have been disproportionately 
affected by the spike in domestic violence during lockdown.260 The pandemic 
has led to what has been characterised as a ‘shadow pandemic’ of domestic 
violence.261 While it would unquestionably be a reasonable excuse for a woman 
to leave her home to escape from an abusive partner, the lockdowns have 
exacerbated a situation in which women are deprived of economic independence 
and trapped in circumstances of coercive control and violence.
According to NWCI, in many cases, ‘women gave birth without a partner or 
loved one present, and faced into motherhood without family or professional 
support.’262
The religion ground
As we saw in chapter 3, it is difficult to ascertain whether in-person religious 
services were prohibited during Stage A and (particularly) Stage F. To the extent 
that they were, this disproportionately affected those with religious beliefs as 
well as interfering with guarantees of the free practice of religion, protected by 
both the Constitution and international human rights law. In keeping with our 
conclusions above, the public health imperative probably provides sufficient 
justification for these measures. Nevertheless, the interference with rights and 
the particular impact on a group identified by proscribed grounds under several 
national and international legal instruments, in addition to the contravention of the 
principle of non-discrimination under international human rights law, should be a 
significant concern for policy-makers.
The age ground: older people, younger people, and education
The pandemic itself has disproportionately affected older people. Moreover, very 
serious concerns arise in relation to the advice on ‘cocooning’ given to older people 
during Stage A—both for its effect and because of the way in which the advice 
was presented as being close to mandatory. We address this as a troublesome 
instance of indirect enforcement in chapter 9. The legal restrictions, however, 
have never directly discriminated on the basis of age, and—as noted above—have 
been careful to allow for care of vulnerable people. The later provisions of paired 
households go even further in this regard, allowing one household of parents and 
children to be paired with one household of grandparents. In our view, therefore, 
260  Cate McCurry, ‘Coronavirus in Ireland: Thousands more women call domestic violence services over 
lockdown’, The Sunday Times (10 November 2020); Oxfam Ireland, ‘Women bearing the burden in the fight 
against Coronavirus’ https://www.oxfamireland.org/blog/women-bearing-burden-fight-against-coronavirus 
accessed 19 November 2020.
261  Mary Murphy, ‘Gender Impacts of Covid-19: Towards a Gender Sensitive Recovery’ (14 July 2020).
262  NWCI, ‘NWCI calls for a one-off extension to maternity leave and pay’ (7 July 2020).
older people have not been disproportionately affected by the direct legal effects 
of the regulations.
During Stage A, attending education was not a reasonable excuse for leaving 
home. The provision of education remotely raised a number of concerns, especially 
for students with special educational needs for whom interruptions to education 
pose particular problems. As noted in chapter 1, the right to primary education 
guaranteed under the Constitution is a right to appropriate education to the child’s 
needs. It may be more difficult, therefore, to justify the provision of educations 
remotely for those with special needs.
Remote education is particularly challenging for those with unreliable broadband 
connections—whether for financial reasons or because they live in rural areas. 
During Stage F, attending education was a reasonable excuse for leaving home, 
although it is only permitted for post-secondary education to the extent that 
it is necessary for educational reasons to attend in person. This was a welcome 
vindication of both the right to education and the rights of the child.263
The age ground does not ordinarily apply in respect of people under the age of 
18, so the exclusion of children from primary and secondary education would not 
appear to be captured. Nevertheless, the adverse consequences on this age-group 
are numerous and well-documented, encompassing school closures, lack of social 
interaction, extended isolation.264 These also may amount to infringements on the 
right to education.
It is also worth noting that the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which 
applies to individuals under the age of 18, has four primary principles which are of 
relevance here: the principle of non-discrimination (Article 2), the best interests of 
the child (Article 3), the right to life, survival and development (Article 6), and the 
right of the child to participate and to be heard (Article 12). In addition, the issue 
of intersectional discrimination must be borne in mind, for example, relating to 
children with disabilities or children living in direct provision who are also deprived 
of their right to education. In the case of young people over the age of 18, the 
general move to online rather than in-person activities—whether in third level 
education or in employment—disproportionately affects younger people since 
relationship-forming is essential to personal development at this stage in their 
lives. The restrictions on children’s education during Stage A were particularly 
experienced by those in socioeconomic disadvantaged families, a point raised by 
IHREC in its submission to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child.265 This 
submission also drew attention to other important impacts of the pandemic on 
263  The return to remote education in January 2021 has seen these issues resurface.
264  ESRI, The Implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for policy in relation to children and young people (July 
2020).
265  IHREC, ‘Submission to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on the List of Issues Prior to 
Reporting for the fourth periodic examination of Ireland’ (July 2020).
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children that lie somewhat beyond the scope of this Report, including violence 
against children and children in care.
Race, nationality, or ethnic background
During Stage E, people were legally prohibited from leaving their locked down 
county or the State, without a reasonable excuse. During Stage F, a person who is 
ordinarily not resident in the State has a reasonable excuse for leaving their home 
for the purposes of leaving the State. This implies that non-nationals resident in 
the State do not have such a reasonable excuse. However, they could fall under 
another reasonable excuse, such as leaving home to care for a vulnerable person 
in another State. These provisions disproportionately affect non-nationals as 
they have greater reason to leave the State. However, for the same reason as 
above, we consider that such an infringement is proportionate in the interests of 
counteracting the pandemic. People who leave the State are likely to return to the 
State, thereby risking the reintroduction of the virus.
Residents of direct provision centres have been disproportionately affected by the 
pandemic.266 The main driver here, however, is not so much the regulations but the 
problematic character of direct provision itself.267
The educational impacts of the pandemic may also be more acutely felt by the 
children of immigrants for various reasons, such as being perhaps more likely to 
lack access to fast and reliable internet, or to have a parent whose first language 
is English who can assist with supplementing online tuition or conduct a form of 
home schooling.268
Anecdotal evidence has pointed to the fact that restrictions may be having a 
disproportionate psychological effect on migrants who are unable to access 
support networks across international borders.269 This has prompted the initiation 
of a study by academics from Mary Immaculate College (MIC) in Limerick and 
Nottingham Trent University which aims to examine how COVID-19 restrictions 
have affected the lives of people who travelled regularly between Britain and 
Ireland. Dr Marc Scully, lecturer in psychology at MIC and principal investigator 
on the study, said the required 14-day quarantine period for those who travel to 
266  Irish Refugee Council, ‘Powerless’: Experiences of Direct Provision during the Covid-19 Pandemic (10 
August 2020).
267  See IHREC, ‘Statement from the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission In Respect of Direct 
Provision,’ (8 May 2020); IHREC, ‘Statement from the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission In Respect 




269  Sorcha Pollak, ‘Study to review impact of travel restraints on families between Ireland and Britain’ , The 
Irish Times (9 November 2020).
Ireland had caused ‘significant disruption’ to the lives of those who previously lived 
‘transnational lives’ and regularly travelled between the jurisdictions.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has also 
reported that the coronavirus disproportionately affects migrants.270 The OECD 
even noted Ireland as one region where migrants have been particularly affected. 
It was stated that in general children of migrants have been disproportionately 
affected by school closures and the subsequent transition to home schooling. 
This was because, on average, these children were less likely to benefit from 
parental help with lessons due to language barriers (noting that 40% of native-
born children of immigrants do not speak the host-country language at home) and 
were less likely to have access to a home computer. Children were also often at a 
disadvantage because of lack of space at home.
270  OECD, ‘What is the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on immigrants and their children?’, (19 October 
2020).
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Conclusion  
The regulations impose significant restrictions on several rights protected by 
the Constitution and international human rights law. Nevertheless, we consider 
that the public health threat posed by the pandemic is sufficient to provide 
a justification for these restrictions. That said, the restrictions have been 
implemented in ways that breach the rule of law and that disproportionately 
affect disadvantaged and vulnerable groups identified by proscribed grounds of 
discrimination and international human rights treaties. We make the following 
recommendations to address these issues.
Rather than have a general category of ‘reasonable excuses’, we recommend 
that regulations should relieve people of criminal liability where there are urgent 
and compelling reasons for their action. We recommend the immediate repeal 
of Part V of the Emergency Provisions Act to reverse the relaxation in safeguards 
on detention for mental health grounds. We recommend that the definition of 
‘essential retail services’ deployed in Stages A and F be amended to cover all 
family necessities. We recommend that the Joint Oireachtas Committee on 
Disability Matters review the impact of COVID-19 and the State’s response on 
the rights of disabled people. Consistent with the public body equality obligation, 
we recommend that greater consideration be given by both NPHET and 
Government to the needs of those with caring responsibilities (the family status 
ground), women and mothers, those with difficulties relating to mental health and 
intellectual capacity, older people, children, people with disabilities, non-nationals, 
prisoners, those from racial and ethnic minorities, and those living below the 
poverty line.
 ʥ  ...the restrictions have been implemented in ways that 
breach the rule of law and that disproportionately 
affect disadvantaged and vulnerable groups identified 
by proscribed grounds of discrimination and 
international human rights treaties.
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Chapter 9
Human Rights and 
Equality Analysis of 
Enforcement Powers
Introduction
In chapter 8, we conducted a human rights and equality analysis of the restrictions 
introduced as part of Ireland’s COVID-19 response. In this chapter, we turn to a 
separate but related topic: the powers for the enforcement of those restrictions. 
We provide a human rights and equality analysis of these powers, both what they 
mean in the abstract and how they have been applied in practice.
Abstract analysis of enforcement powers
Criminal sanctions for breach of penal provisions
For the most part, provisions have only been deemed to be ‘penal provisions’ 
where they apply to commercial or public activities, such as the occupiers of 
business premises and the organisers of events outside the home. This is not 
a direct concern of this Report. In Stage A and Stage F, however, the prohibition 
on leaving one’s home without a reasonable excuse is a penal provision. Since 
22 November 2020, it has also been a criminal offence to organise or attend a 
prohibited event in a dwelling. While there are differing views on the wisdom of this 
approach, we do not consider that it offends any provision of the Constitution or 
international human rights law. In chapter 8, we concluded that these restrictions 
on movement were permissible. We reach the same conclusion in relation to the 
criminal sanctions prescribed in Stages A and F: the sanctions are low, with further 
gradations introduced by the Health Amendment Act to respect proportionality.
Garda directions to ensure compliance with penal provisions
Because the prohibition on leaving one’s home is qualified by so many ‘reasonable 
excuses’, it functions effectively as a requirement that people not be moving 
about for impermissible reasons or for excessive distances. These prohibitions 
are primarily enforced by Gardaí stopping people to inquire as to why they have 
left their home and directing them to return to their home if they have left for an 
impermissible reason. On the one hand, it would seem that if criminal sanctions 
may be imposed in these circumstances, there can be no objection to the far 
lesser consequence of being directed to return home. On the other hand, police 
questioning of people as to why they have left their home marks a significant change 
 ʥ  ...police questioning of people as to why they have 
left their home marks a significant change in the 
traditional relationship between Gardaí and members 
of the public.
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in the traditional relationship between Gardaí and members of the public. Our view is 
that this enforcement power is, in principle, legitimate. However, there are very real 
concerns as to how it might be exercised in practice, to which we turn below.
Powers of ‘relevant persons’
The Minister may designate people as ‘relevant persons’ for the purposes of 
implementing and enforcing the regulations. The relevant person may require a 
Garda to assist him or her in exercising a power or performing a function under 
the Act. This assistance could involve detaining a person, bringing a person to a 
particular place, or breaking open a premises. At the time of writing, the ‘relevant 
persons’ under the regulations include employees and agents of public transport 
operators (under the regulations relating to face coverings) and immigration 
officials / members of the HSE contact tracing team (under the regulations 
relating to tracking international passengers). It is, in our view, inappropriate for 
transport employees and HSE contact tracers to have the power to require Gardaí 
to detain people or break open premises. We are not aware of these powers being 
exercised but, in our view, they may offend protections in both the Constitution 
and international human rights law for liberty and the dwelling. We therefore 
recommend that the Health Preservation Act be amended so that ‘relevant 
persons’ can only request Garda enforcement, not require Garda enforcement.
Fixed-penalty notices
The Health Amendment Act introduced provisions, activated on 22 November, 
to allow a Garda, if he or she has reasonable grounds for believing that a person 
has contravened a fixed penalty provision, to serve a fixed penalty notice on 
the person. If the person pays the penalty, which can range from €80 to €500 
depending on the offence, within 28 days, no prosecution will proceed. In principle, 
we consider that it is permissible to designate penal provisions as fixed-penalty 
notices. In the road traffic context, the High Court has held unconstitutional 
provisions that prevented an accused person from arguing that he had not 
received the fixed penalty notice.271 This reasoning would also apply in respect 
of fixed-penalty notices in the COVID-19 context, but it does not undermine our 
view that fixed-penalty notices are themselves permissible. There is a concerning 
ambiguity in the Health Amendment Act, however, in that it does not specify 
who can determine the level of the fixed-penalty notice. The principle of legality 
requires, we suggest, that the Minister for Health must specify the penalty-level(s) 
in regulations if he activates this power. The Minister has specified the penalty in 
the relevant regulations, but we recommend that the Health Amendment Act be 
amended to clarify that this is a requirement. 272
271  O’Byrne v Director of Public Prosecutions [2019] IEHC 715.
272  Further scrutiny will be necessary on the use in practice of these fixed penalty notices as they have 
Dwelling provisions
The dwelling receives particular protection under the Irish Constitution and is also 
protected as the locus of private and family life in international human rights law. 
As we saw in chapter 8, there is no restriction on activities within the dwelling, 
other than that—in stages A and F—non-members of the household cannot 
enter the dwelling. Since 22 November 2020, it is an offence both to organise and 
attend a prohibited event in a dwelling. The dwelling event enforcement provisions 
apply. These allow a Garda (a) to direct a person to leave the place and vicinity of a 
dwelling, (b) direct the occupier of a dwelling to cause everyone attending an event 
to leave, other than those who live there, and (c) to attend at the main entrance 
to the dwelling and to require the occupier to provide his or her name. In our view, 
these provisions do not offend the various protections under the Constitution and 
international human rights law. They do not unreasonably restrict what can occur in 
the dwelling, nor do they permit Gardaí to enter the dwelling. Again, however, they 
do allow for a more intrusive approach to policing than traditional and significant 
concerns could arise about how these powers may be exercised in practice.273
The exercise of enforcement powers
Applicable principles
Irish constitutional law does not directly speak to the practice of law enforcement, 
generally allowing a wide discretion to enforcement authorities. International human 
rights law, however, does address this subject. The ICCPR and those sources of law 
interpreting the ICCPR provide guidance on penalties for violations of extraordinary 
measures adopted during a state of emergency. In short, measures should be 
enforced in a humane manner, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, 
and penalties should not be imposed arbitrarily or discriminatorily. Deprivation of 
liberty should be considered as a last resort, in accordance with the law and observing 
procedural safeguards. Deprivation of liberty must also be reasonable, necessary 
and proportionate.274 In addition, attention must be paid to potential overcrowding 
in detention centres and the risk of spreading and contracting COVID-19 in such a 
context.275 Moreover, fines should be commensurate to the seriousness of the offence, 
with particular regard for potential gender-specific impacts and the implications for 
those who are unemployed.
become more prevalent as a feature of enforcement in early 2021.
273  Further concerns about the integrity of the dwelling may arise in respect of enforcement of mandatory 
quarantine for international passengers if this is done in the home.
274  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Topics in Focus|Emergency Measures and 
COVID-19: Guidance’ (OHCHR 27 April 2020), 4. Additional guidance on the right to liberty and security of the 
person is available in the UN Human Rights Committee’s, General Comment No. 35 (2014), UN Doc CCPR/C/
GC/35.
275  OHCHR, ‘Topics in Focus|Emergency Measures and COVID-19: Guidance’, 4.
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With respect to law enforcement of extraordinary measures, the OHCHR notes 
that officials ‘may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent 
required for the performance of their duty and only when less harmful measures 
have proven to be clearly ineffective’.276 In addition, allegations of human rights 
violations by law enforcement and military personnel, must be effectively and 
promptly investigated and perpetrators brought to justice. ‘This is particularly 
important in light of the extensive powers given to law enforcement and military 
personnel in many areas during the Covid-19 pandemic.’277
As we note above, the enforcement powers introduced during the pandemic are 
permissible in principle. But they do greatly increase the number of enforcement 
contexts in which Gardaí may interact with people, from holding events in their 
homes to simply leaving their homes. Any concern that Gardaí exercise enforcement 
powers unevenly is exacerbated by the significant increase in the number of 
enforcement contexts. Prior to the pandemic, there were such concerns. In 
2019, the CSO reported that while only 1.7% of people reported experiencing 
discrimination when in contact with the Gardaí, the number was significantly higher 
in the 18-24 age group (3.9%) and among unemployed people (6.9%).278 The type 
of interactions most cited in relation to discrimination were being stopped in a 
vehicle and being stopped on the street, the sort of enforcement contexts that are 
significantly increased during the pandemic. Coincidentally, during the COVID -19 
response, an internal Garda survey on attitudes of its members to various ethnic 
groups suggested negative attitudes towards members of the Traveller and Roma 
communities. Opinions of other ethnic minorities were somewhat better. However, 
significant proportions of frontline Gardaí still had negative views of Indian and 
Pakistani people (21 per cent), Arabs (30 per cent) and Black African people (30 
per cent).279 This is consistent with data cited by Pavee Point, compiled before the 
pandemic recording evidence of discrimination and ethnic profiling experienced by 
Travellers and Roma.280 It is in this context that we must approach the exercise of 
enforcement powers during the pandemic.
Data on the exercise of enforcement powers
Having adequate data on use of enforcement powers is absolutely essential to 
understand the use of these powers and whether they comply with relevant human 
rights standards. Proportionality, the core test for measuring rights restrictions, 
looks at rights restrictions in practice, at their actual impact; to best assess 
proportionality, we need to understand how these measures have been put into 
276  ibid, 4.
277  ibid, 5.
278  Central Statistics Office, ‘Equality and Discrimination 2019’ (CSO Statistical Release, 4 July 2019).
279  See, Conor Gallagher, ‘Gardaí have negative view of Travellers, survey finds’, The Irish Times (Dublin, 20 
August 2020).
280  See Pavee Point, ‘Submission to the Department of Justice and Equality: Towards the Development of a 
Strategy for the Criminal Justice System’ (August, 2020).
practice. In April 2020, the Minister for Justice and Equality requested the Garda 
Commissioner to compile and publish weekly data on the use of COVID-related 
policing powers, with a view to ensuring transparency. The Garda reports are 
available to view online.281 In addition, the Policing Authority has published nine 
reports during the COVID crisis which have assessed policing performance by 
the Gardaí in relation to the COVID-19 regulations.282 These reports came about 
as a result of a request on 16 April 2020 by the Minister for Justice and Equality, 
asking the Policing Authority to report on its own oversight activities, to assess 
the application of the COVID-19 regulations by the Gardaí and to reflect on the 
consistency of their application with specific reference to vulnerable groups. The 
Policing Authority also published other relevant reports including a submission 
to the Garda Commissioner regarding the use of anti-spit hoods during the 
COVID-19 crisis.
The Policing Authority has stated that it ‘remains in continuing contact with the 
Garda Commissioner and his colleagues to ensure that policing responses and 
any use of new powers are necessary, proportionate and carried out in a manner 
that respects human rights.’283 In a number of reports, the Policing Authority 
expressed concern that the data which the Gardaí are reporting in relation to their 
use of COVID-related powers is insufficient and does not allow the Authority to 
adequately assess whether the powers are being exercised in a manner which is 
‘reasonable, necessary and proportionate’. In the Authority’s second report of 6 
May 2020, it raised concerns in relation to the lack of disaggregated data.284 IHREC 
has repeatedly called for such disaggregated data to be provided.285
In the subsequent report of 20 May 2020, the Authority reported that the 
Gardaí had failed to provide the requested disaggregation as to how each of the 
emergency powers had been used:
The Garda Síochána committed to providing this breakdown [...] It is 
therefore a source of disappointment to report that the Garda Síochána have 
failed to deliver this information again. Given the infringement these powers 
represent on an individual’s human rights, it is concerning that these powers 
have not been recorded adequately and that there is insufficient data to 
inform both internal and external oversight.286
281  Department of Justice, ‘Use of Covid-19 related powers by An Garda Síochána’, <http://www.justice.ie/
en/JELR/Pages/Use_of_Covid-19_related_powers_by_An_Garda_S%C3%ADoch%C3%A1na> accessed 19 
November 2020.
282  Policing Authority, ‘Oversight of COVID 19 Policing’, <https://www.policingauthority.ie/en/about-us/
detail/oversight-of-covid-19-policing> accessed 19 November 2020.
283  ibid.
284  Policing Authority, ‘Policing Performance by the Garda Síochána in Relation to COVID-19 Regulations’, (6 
May 2020), 11.
285  IHREC, ‘Letter to Garda Commissioner on COVID Powers Policing’ (28 April 2020); IHREC, 
‘Commission’s Call for Additional Data from An Garda Síochána on COVID Policing Restated in Policing 
Authority Report’ (22 May 2020).
286  Policing Authority, ‘Policing Performance by the Garda Síochána in Relation to COVID-19 Regulations’, 
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IHREC has also expressed concerns regarding the need for An Garda Síochána to 
provide disaggregated data on extraordinary policing activity during the pandemic, 
highlighting in particular that ‘while numbers are provided on the number of times 
powers were used, further anonymised data is not provided in relation to the 
gender, ethnicity or age of people engaged with.’287
In its report of 9 November 2020, the Authority reported that, at present, 
community groups are generally satisfied that COVID-19 powers are being 
used only as necessary and in a proportionate manner.288 However, the 
Authority emphasised that such groups remain ‘keenly alert’ to the ‘potential 
for discriminatory use or the perception of discriminatory use of the powers’. 
The Authority acknowledged that ‘in many instances [the belief in the potential 
discriminatory use of powers] is premised on the relationships that existed 
between groups in the community and the Garda Síochána pre COVID-19.’ The 
Authority acknowledged that for many of these groups, ‘if the perception exists 
that a cohort within the community is typically treated differently to the general 
public, then the expectation exists that this will also be the case in terms of 
policing of the COVID-19 restrictions.’289
Groups experiencing disadvantage or discrimination
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has made it clear that 
emergency legislation passed to address the COVID-19 crisis ‘should not be used 
as a basis to target particular individuals or groups, including minorities’:290
Measures taken must not involve prohibited discrimination on any grounds 
such as race, colour, sex, sexual orientation and gender, identity, disability, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.291
Moreover, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has recently 
published a General Recommendation on racial profiling by law enforcement 
officials, noting that:
(20 May 2020), 4.
287  Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission, ‘Commission’s Call for Additional Data from An Garda 
Síochána on COVID Policing Restated in Policing Authority Report’ (22 May 2020).
288  Policing Authority, ‘Report on Policing Performance by the Garda Síochána during COVID-19’ (9 
November 2020), 9.
289  The very large number of fixed penalty notices issued in January makes it even more acutely necessary 
to have disaggregated data on enforcement as suggested in this section.
290  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Topics in Focus|Emergency Measures and 
COVID-19: Guidance’ (OHCHR 27 April 2020), 2.
291  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Topics in Focus|Emergency Measures and 
COVID-19: Guidance’ (OHCHR 27 April 2020), 2.
Racial profiling is linked to stereotypes and biases, which can be conscious or 
unconscious, individual, or institutional and structural. Stereotyping becomes 
a violation of international human rights law when stereotypical assumptions 
are put into practice to undermine the enjoyment of human rights.292
The lack of disaggregated data makes it difficult to be sure whether these attitudes 
manifest themselves in the exercise of the COVID-19 enforcement powers. But 
some anecdotal evidence does point to inconsistent patterns of enforcement. In 
addition, there is anecdotal evidence that students and young people have been 
subjected to more stringent policing during this time.
The Policing Authority noted that they had engaged with young people and students 
on the question of discriminatory use of enforcement powers.293 This group expressed 
to the Policing Authority that they expected they would be more stringently policed 
during the pandemic. There is some evidence that this has been the case. There have 
been reports that in situations where Gardaí suspected students to be in breach of 
COVID-19 measures, such students were subjected to an apparently unique policing 
measure involving the confiscation of student IDs which were then handed over to 
university authorities. One such incident which was reported in the media,294 involved 
the Gardaí entering a house, apparently without a warrant, where a student house 
party had taken place and confiscating student IDs of students at University College 
Cork (UCC). These student IDs were then passed onto authorities at UCC. The Policing 
Authority made reference to this practice in its most recent report and noted that a 
college or university can ‘typically commence a disciplinary procedure with the student 
involved, which can result in a fine’.295 The Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL) also 
called the legality of these measures into question.296 The Policing Authority also noted 
other measures taken in the policing of students, such as having Gardaí present on 
campuses. The Authority stated that students were seeking greater clarity on these 
measures:
Reference was made to the need for clarity and better communication with 
students as to the arrangements that exist between the Garda Síochána and 
some third level institutions. These relate to the garda presence on campus 
but also arrangements with some third level institutions in relation to the 
confiscation of student cards by the Garda Síochána who then hand these cards 
over to the college authorities. The college or university can typically commence 
292  The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination recently released its General 
Recommendation No. 36: Preventing and Combatting Racial Profiling by Law Enforcement Officials (CERD/C/
GC/36) (24 November 2020) at para 20.
293  Policing Authority, ‘Report on Policing Performance by the Garda Síochána during COVID-19’ (9 
November 2020), 9.
294  Conor Pope, ‘Civil rights group concerned as gardaí search students after house party’, The Irish Times 
(Dublin, 3 October 2020)
295  Policing Authority, ‘Report on Policing Performance by the Garda Síochána during COVID-19’ (9 
November 2020), 9-10.
296  ICCL, ‘Monitoring rights during the pandemic’ (October 2020) 1.
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a disciplinary procedure with the student involved, which can result in a fine. 
Such agreements are not uniform across the country and media narratives 
and a lack of clarity for students as to whether their institution is party to such 
an arrangement and how that process works, was reported as not helpful. 
Examples of positive engagement between student groups and local Gardaí 
were given and the positive impact of visible policing as an effective deterrent 
was emphasised.297
Anti-spit hoods
In September 2020, the Policing Authority noted a number of human rights 
concerns regarding the use of anti-spit hoods:
[T]here are a number of incidents internationally in which anti-spit hoods 
were deployed in cases where people died. More generally, hooding (which 
is a form of sensory deprivation) is widely considered to be a form of ill-
treatment which can in some circumstances amount to torture…
As an instrument of force, the application of anti-spit hoods by Garda 
members has the potential to breach fundamental human rights including 
the right to human dignity, the right to life, the right not to be subjected 
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the 
right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence which 
encompasses the right to physical, moral and psychological integrity.298
The Authority noted that it ‘is particularly concerned by the application of anti-spit 
hoods on children to date and wishes to restate its fundamental opposition to the 
use of the devices on those under the age of 18’.299 IHREC has also raised concerns 
with An Garda Síochána about the use of anti-spit hoods.300
In its report of 9 November 2020, the Authority published a breakdown of certain 
characteristics of persons (such as sex, age and disability) who were subjected to 
the use of anti-spit hoods, revealing that spit hoods have been used on children 
and people with obvious intellectual disabilities.301 This confirmed earlier media 
reports from September 2020:
At least 14 per cent of spit-hood deployments by gardaí since the start of the 
297  Policing Authority, ‘Report on Policing Performance by the Garda Síochána during COVID-19’ (9 
November 2020), 10.
298  Policing Authority, ‘Evaluation of Management and Use of Anti-Spit Guards’ (10 September 2020) 4-5.
299  ibid 6.
300  IHREC, ‘Letter to Assistant Commissioner Dublin Metropolitan Region re Use of Anti-Spit Guards by An 
Garda Síochána’ (22 September 2020).
301  Policing Authority, ‘Report on Policing Performance by the Garda Síochána during COVID-19’ (9 
November 2020), 8.
Covid-19 pandemic have involved people with obvious mental illnesses. And 
a spit hood was used on at least one person with an obvious learning disability 
and on five children, including one who was 14 years old.302
The Authority also contended that there was a lack of scientific evidence as to the 
effectiveness of anti-spit guards in preventing the transmission of COVID-19. It 
stated that it had ‘contacted the manufacturer and distributor of the anti-spit hood 
device used by the Garda Síochána. They stated that the device is designed to 
prevent spitting into the face of a police officer. It cannot be guaranteed to prevent 
the transmission of other aerosols and has not been tested against airborne or 
respiratory droplets of COVID-19’.303 Finally, the Authority expressed concern as to 
the limited training provided prior to the use of anti-spit hoods and indicated that it 
considers the current training of viewing a short online video to be inadequate.304
Requirements for data collection
The UN has stated that authorities should be open and transparent in their 
decision-making:
The free flow of timely, accurate, factual information and disaggregated data, 
including by sex, is essential, so those seeking to scrutinize or critique the 
effectiveness of government actions must be able to play their part.305
The UN Human Rights Council has also noted that governments and international 
actors, should start, as soon as possible, gathering adequate data on the impact of 
the COVID-19 crisis:
Data should be disaggregated at least by gender, age, disability, income, race 
and ethnicity. Such disaggregated data is needed to accurately assess the 
situation, to make inequalities visible, and to identify those who have been 
left behind.306
Further:
[T]he international response to Covid-19 needs global and national statistical 
systems to collaborate to provide the data and statistical evidence to 
understand the scope of the pandemic, including disaggregated data to 
302  Conor Gallagher, ‘Teenager (14) one of five children placed in spit-hoods by gardaí’ The Irish Times (22 
September 2020).
303  Policing Authority, ‘Evaluation of Management and Use of Anti-Spit Guards’ (10 September 2020) 3.
304  ibid 6.
305  United Nations, COVID-19 and Human Rights: We Are All in This Together (April 2020) 13.
306  United Nations Human Rights Council, ‘”Leave No One Behind”: Don’t Forget Your Commitments in 
Your Response to the COVID-19 Crisis, UN Expert Urges States’ (9 April 2020) https://www.ohchr.org/EN/
HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=25786&LangID=E accessed 15 November 2020.
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monitor disproportional impacts.307
In a recent publication, Praia City Group, created by the UN Statistical Commission, 
emphasised the importance of obtaining accurate government data in ensuring 
that COVID-19 responses are in line with principles of equality and human rights.308
Now more than ever, official statistics on governance have a crucial role 
to play to ensure that major, life-changing decisions are based on the best 
available information. Policymakers who are looking for ways to apply the 
principles of equality, accountability and participation to their COVID-19 
response need timely and sound data to know how well they are succeeding 
in doing so… Reliable and trustworthy governance statistics can play a vital 
role in informing a well-calibrated response to the pandemic and in detecting 
and mitigating potential ‘secondary impacts’.309
Not only are governance statistics essential for policy-making, but they are also 
crucial for those seeking to hold government to account in the enforcement of 
COVID-19 measures:
They can be used to hold the government to account on its response plan and 
recovery strategy, at a time when many normal oversight and accountability 
processes (such as elections, meetings of parliament and other political 
activities) have been severely disrupted over safety concerns.310
The failure to maintain disaggregated data not merely runs the risk of concealing 
human rights violations; it is itself a significant breach of international human 
rights law.311 The Garda Commissioner should therefore take steps to ensure that 
disaggregated data is obtained on the exercise of all enforcement powers.
307  United Nations, COVID-19 and Human Rights: We Are All in This Together (April 2020) 19.
308  Praia City Group, Governance Statistics in the COVID-19 Era (Praia City Group Guidance Note, 
September 2020).
309  Ibid at 2.
310  Ibid.
311  This point has been emphasised by IHREC on numerous occasions, including in its recent submission 
to the CERD Committee: Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission, Ireland and the Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Submission to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination on Ireland’s Combined 5th to 9th Report (October 2019) at 7, 22.
 ʥ  The failure to maintain disaggregated data not merely 
runs the risk of concealing human rights violations; 
it is itself a significant breach of international human 
rights law. The Garda Commissioner should therefore 
take steps to ensure that disaggregated data is 
obtained on the exercise of all enforcement powers.
Indirect enforcement
The rule of law requires that the application of law must be congruent with the 
law as written. Only state action authorised in advance by law is legitimate. It is 
highly problematic, therefore, if the Government encourages or allows a general 
misunderstanding to take hold to the effect that a particular activity is legally 
prohibited. Such an approach may also offend the principle of legality outlined in 
international human rights law most vividly through Articles 7 and 15 of the ECHR 
and the ICCPR respectively. The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly 
emphasised that people are entitled to know, insofar as this is reasonable in the 
circumstances, what the legal implications of their actions are. The consequences 
of behaviour, according to the Court, must be ‘foreseeable’.312 In other words, a law 
must be sufficiently accessible and precise so as to permit an individual to regulate 
his or her conduct on the basis of that law. If the principle of legality requires 
specificity, certainty, foreseeability, and non-retroactivity, it is arguable that it also 
prohibits governments from encouraging citizens to believe that they are legally 
prohibited from actions that are in fact legally permitted. Public health advice is an 
important and legitimate component of the State’s response to COVID-19, but it 
should not be presented as if it were mandatory.
We have already raised this rule of law concern in chapter 7 in relation to several 
issues. The most problematic of these, because it directly targets a vulnerable 
group protected in both national and international human rights law, was the 
‘cocooning’ of elderly people. It is clear that many people over the age of 70 
believed during Stage A that they were legally required not to leave their houses. 
This was not the case. In our view, the Government’s communication strategy 
attempted to secure the quasi-legal enforcement of public health advice, in a 
manner that may infringe the principle of legality.
In another dimension of the COVID-19 response, it seems the Government went 
further in seeking to use the enforcement powers of the State to control alleged 
breaches of public health guidance. As we saw from chapters 3 and 7, there has 
never been any legal obligation on persons arriving in the State to quarantine 
although different arms of the Government have implied in their communications 
that this is the case. In July 2020, a controversy arose about the denial, by the 
312  Liivik v Estonia App no 12157/05 (25 June 2009); Alimuçaj v Albania App no 20134/05 (7 February 2012); 
Vyerentsov v Ukraine App no 20372/11 (11 April 2013).
 ʥ  In our view, the Government’s communication strategy 
attempted to secure the quasi-legal enforcement of 
public health advice, in a manner that may infringe 
the principle of legality.
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Department of Social Protection (DSP), of the Pandemic Unemployment Payment 
(PUP) and other welfare benefits to those travelling abroad for holidays during the 
COVID-19 pandemic.313 Reports indicated that the DSP had sanctioned over 100 
persons in receipt of the PUP who took holidays abroad.314 A spokesperson for DSP 
stated that the PUP is ‘not paid to people who go on holidays abroad or when they 
are going through their subsequent 14 day quarantine [sic] period’315 and the then 
Minister for Social Protection stated that the rationale for this approach was that 
the State should not subsidise people who are in breach of public health advice.316
In previous years, jobseekers in receipt of social welfare unemployment payments 
were allowed to take 2 weeks holidays abroad. This was set out in the Social 
Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control Provisions) Regulations 2007317 
in the case of jobseeker’s benefit and on an administrative basis in the case of 
jobseeker’s allowance.
However, on 30 June 2020, as Free Legal Advice Centres (FLAC) has shown, DSP 
issued a circular on the issue which purported to suspend travel abroad and to say 
that people who returned from such travel could not be considered to be genuinely 
seeking work (GSW) during the period of two weeks self-isolation.318 There were 
several problems with this. First, the circular purported to ‘suspend’ the provisions 
of SI 142 of 2007. Of course, a circular cannot amend a Ministerial Regulation. In 
addition, the question of whether somebody is GSW is a question of fact. Given 
the prevalence of online job-searching, applications and Zoom interviews, it is 
perfectly possible for a person to be GSW even if self-isolating so the circular 
appeared to attempt to unlawfully fetter the discretion of deciding officers.
On 10 July, Minister Humphreys amended the regulations by introduction of the 
Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control) (Amendment) (No. 9) 
(Absence from the State) Regulations 2020.319 These regulations provided that 
jobseeker’s benefit would only be payable where the claimant is on holidays in 
accordance with ‘the COVID-19 General Travel Advisory in operation by the 
Department of Foreign Affairs’.320 At that time, DFA was advising against all non-
essential travel abroad but this, of course, changed with the introduction of the 
Green List allowing travel to certain countries which was followed, more recently, 
by the EU ‘traffic lights’ approach.321
313  Jack Horgan-Jones and Marie O’Halloran, ‘Eighty five people who had Covid payment cut for leaving 
Ireland may get it back’ The Irish Times (28 July 2020).
314  Garreth MacNamee, ‘104 people have had their Covid unemployment payment stopped due to 
international travel’ The Journal (26 July 2020).
315  ibid.
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321  Sorcha Pollak, ‘State joins EU traffic-light system for international travel’ The Irish Times (8 November 
When the issue broke in the media in July, the Government and Department 
obfuscated for a number of days failing to explain what it was doing, why it was 
doing so or what the legal basis was. It then introduced legislation to put PUP 
on a statutory basis, which is a welcome measure.322 In the course of Oireachtas 
debates on this Act, the Minister now stated that PUP was a supplementary 
welfare allowance payment under s. 202 of the Social Welfare Acts which allows 
payments in urgent cases.323 Ultimately the Government did accept that payment 
of unemployment payments could be made to persons travelling abroad in 
accordance with the COVID-19 General Travel Advisory.
However, a further issue (which affects all those in receipt of unemployment 
welfare payments leaving the country) is the basis on which DSP obtains 
information as to their departure. This appears to be from social welfare inspectors 
questioning people in Dublin airport and other ports. The basis for this is s. 
250(16B) of the Social Welfare Acts but, as several commentators have noted, this 
requires the inspector to have ‘reasonable grounds to believe that there has been 
a contravention of this Act’.324 This would seem to rule out a general ‘stop and 
question’ of persons travelling through Dublin airport or boarding specific flights. 
The Data Protection Commission has now expressed ‘serious doubts’ over the 
lawfulness of the collection of personal data in this manner.325
This episode was a questionable use of powers under the Social Welfare Acts in 
order to apply legal sanctions to people for breaching public health guidance.
Conclusion  
The enforcement powers conferred by the Acts are, in principle, permissible 
under both the Constitution and international human rights law. However, there 
is a reasonable basis—accepted by the Policing Authority—for concern about 
the manner in which these enforcement powers are exercised. The lack of 
disaggregated data precludes an assessment of whether enforcement powers are 
being exercised disproportionately against vulnerable groups identified by grounds 
in the Equal Status Acts or protected in international human rights law. This lack of 
disaggregated data is itself a breach of international human rights law. In addition, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that inconsistent enforcement has occurred.
Discriminatory use of enforcement powers is always a risk. But this risk is 
exacerbated by the features of the COVID-19 response to which we have drawn 
2020).
322  Social Welfare (Covid-19) (Amendment) Act 2020.
323  Heather Humphreys, Dáil Deb 28 July 2020, vol 996, no 1.
324  As inserted by the Social Welfare and Pensions Act 2012, s 17.
325  Jack Horgan-Jones, ‘Data watchdog: “Doubts” over whether welfare inspections at airports were 
lawful’, The Irish Times (30 July 2020).
99 100Ireland’s Emergency Powers During the Covid-19 Pandemic Ireland’s Emergency Powers During the Covid-19 Pandemic
attention in earlier chapters. The late publication of regulations, the misleading 
official descriptions of regulations, and the blurring of the boundary between law 
and advice all contribute to uncertainty about what people’s legal obligations 
are. These are further exacerbated by the ‘reasonable excuse’ exception 
to the movement restrictions. This makes it very difficult to know whether 
enforcement powers can be exercised against people. This can be problematic 
for Gardaí themselves, in the front line of managing an unprecedented public 
health emergency. The confident citizen may be reassured by this vagueness and 
flexibility. However, if you come from a group with a history of bad relations with 
the Gardaí, these features are problematic. You either put yourself at the risk of 
untrammelled discretion by particular Gardaí, or you may restrict your movements 
far more than other members of the public are required to do. Each outcome raises 
human rights and equality concerns.
This blurring of law and guidance has also contributed to indirect enforcement 
of public health guidance as if it were the law, whether through elderly people 
believing themselves to be legally required to remain in their homes, or social 
welfare enforcement powers being turned on those who had left the country.
We recommend two statutory amendments to clarify enforcement powers: first, 
that relevant persons should only be authorised to request rather than require 
Garda enforcement actions; second, that only the Minister for Health can specify 
the fixed penalty to be attached to different penal provisions. We join both IHREC 
and the Policing Authority in recommending that An Garda Síochána maintain 
disaggregated data to allow scrutiny of how enforcement powers are exercised. 
We also reiterate the recommendations from chapter 8 regarding the need to draw 
a clear distinction in all Government communications between public health advice 
and legal obligations.
 ʥ  This blurring of law and guidance has also contributed 
to indirect enforcement of public health guidance 
as if it were the law, whether through elderly people 
believing themselves to be legally required to remain 
in their homes, or social welfare enforcement powers 
being turned on those who had left the country.
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Chapter 10
Recommendations
Consideration of human rights and equality 
concerns in the law-making process
During the pandemic, Members of the Oireachtas have engaged with important 
human rights and equality concerns but their capacity has been limited in two 
respects. First, they do not have access to expert analysis of human rights 
and equality standards at a national and international level. Second, they have 
unsurprisingly found it difficult to engage with human rights and equality issues 
where statutes delegate to the Minister for Health the power to make regulations. 
This difficulty is compounded because the process through which these regulations 
are prepared is an opaque one, involving a complicated and shifting interaction 
between the Minister and NPHET, in which it is difficult to pinpoint when, if at all, 
consideration is given to human rights and equality considerations. We make the 
following recommendations to improve this situation:
1. We recommend the establishment of a Joint Oireachtas Committee on 
Equality, Human Rights and Diversity. This would be adequately resourced to 
assist Members review all primary legislation adopted as part of the COVID-19 
response. It would also exercise an oversight function in relation to all 
secondary legislation.
2. We recommend that all statutes adopted as part of the COVID-19 response 
should be subject to sunset clauses that allow for time-limited extensions of 
three months, by resolution of both Houses of the Oireachtas.
3. We recommend the re-establishment of a NPHET sub-group with the relevant 
expertise to address ethical, human rights, and equality concerns.
4. We recommend that NPHET itself should have members with expertise on 
ethical, human rights, and equality concerns.
5. We recommend that the Government oversight committee that filters NPHET 
recommendations should have representation from the Department of 
Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth.
6. We recommend that the Minister for Health should publish a human rights 
and equality analysis of the proportionality of each set of regulations within 48 
hours of their being made.
7. We recommend amendments to section 31A of the Health Act 1947 to provide 
that all regulations made by the Minister for Health will lapse within 10 sitting 
days if not positively endorsed by a resolution of each House of the Oireachtas.
8. We recommend that the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Equality, Human 
Rights and Diversity scrutinise ex post the regulations made by the Minister 
for Health. It would swiftly issue a report on the impact of each new set of 
regulations.
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Presentation of the law
In chapter 7, we identified how laws have been made retroactively and frequently 
are not made public until several days after they have been made. We make the 
following recommendation to address this issue:
1. We recommend that all regulations should be published at least 48 hours 
prior to coming into force, unless there is an urgent public health reason not 
to do so.
A more deep-seated problem is the way in which the Government has provided 
misleading descriptions of the law and allowed or encouraged a confused blurring 
of law and guidance such that it is close to impossible for conscientious citizens to 
identify the extent of their legal obligations. These are such fundamental tenets 
of a liberal democracy committed to the rule of law that there should be no need 
to make recommendations about them.. Nevertheless, we make the following 
recommendations:
1. We recommend that the Government should at all times and in all 
communications maintain a clear distinction between measures that are 
legally obligatory and public health advice. In particular, the Government 
should not present public health advice as if it were criminally enforceable.
2. We recommend that all sectoral committees should review the 
communication strategy of their Departments to ensure that the information 
relating to COVID-19, and on COVID-19 restrictions in particular, is clear and 
transparent.
 ʥ  We recommend the establishment of a Joint Oireachtas 
Committee on Equality, Human Rights and Diversity. 
This would be adequately resourced to assist Members 
review all primary legislation adopted as part of the 
COVID-19 response.
Enforcement issues
In chapter 9, we identified several problems in relation to the enforcement of 
the regulations. Some of these are rather technical issues that arise because of 
the way in which the statutes are drafted. Others relate to the vague concept of 
‘reasonable excuse’, deployed across the penal provisions. And finally there are 
problems with how the restrictions have been enforced in practice, significantly 
aggravated by a failure on the part of An Garda Síochána to maintain disaggregated 
data. We make the following recommendations to address these issues.
1. We recommend that the ‘relevant person’ provision in section 31A of the 
Health Act 1947 should be amended to ensure that relevant persons can only 
request and not require members of An Garda Síochána to take enforcement 
steps.
2. We recommend that the Health (Amendment) Act 2020 should be amended 
to clarify that the Minister for Health must set the levels of penalties for fixed 
penalty notices.
3. We recommend that regulations should not make criminal liability subject 
to a general ‘reasonable excuse’ provision but should instead have a general 
exception for ‘urgent and compelling reasons’.
4. We recommend that the Garda Commissioner should take steps to ensure 
that the principle of non-discrimination is to the fore in all enforcement 
actions.
5. We recommend that the Garda Commissioner should take steps to ensure 
that disaggregated data is obtained on the exercise of all enforcement 
powers, tracking all prohibited grounds of discrimination under the Equal 
Status Acts 2000-2015.
6. We recommend that the Government should not indirectly enforce public 
health advice through reliance on other statutory regimes.
Detention on mental health grounds
We saw in chapter 8 that the relaxation of procedural safeguards for detention on 
mental health grounds is problematic as a matter of Irish constitutional law and 
international human rights law. We make the following recommendation to address 
this issue:
1. We recommend that Part V of the Emergency Measures in the Public Interest 
(COVID-19) Act 2020 should be repealed as a matter of urgency.
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